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Abstract [139 words]
Rule-consequentialism is an ethical theory that does a better job than any other of
justifying our moral intuitions from a single overarching principle. My dissertation defends
a novel formulation of this view as an account of a good person.
First, I argue that a rule-consequentialist does “what a good person would do,” and that
if everyone were like her, the world would be as good as possible.
Second, good people sometimes do more than is required of them, and so a theory of the
good person must explain supererogation, i.e. “going above and beyond the call of duty.”
Third, I argue that rule-consequentialists have good reasons to embrace different moral
codes for different societies.
Finally, I show that it is fruitful to understand just war theory as a set of near-absolute
constraints designed to minimize the horror of war.
iii
You speak unadvisedly, my friend, if you fancy that a man who is worth anything ought not
to consider only one thing when he is acting: whether he does what is right or wrong, the
actions of a good man or a bad man.
—Socrates, Apology, 28b.
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Chapter 1
The good person as a model for others
1.1 Introduction
Many of us take it as the central goal of our lives to be good people. Good people are
not obviously just those that do the right thing all of the time. Nor are they obviously just
those who accomplish certain things with their lives. And though they do not seek to be
admired, their manner, their conscience, and their psychology cry out for admiration and
for emulation. They are the people we should try to be like; they are the people we should
try to be.
This dissertation defends a theory of the good person, drawn from these general claims.
My foundational assumption, which I will not defend, is that we should try to be good
people. I argue in this chapter that the good person is the person who acts such that, if
everyone followed her example, the world would be as good as possible.
Ultimately, the good person, on this account, will resemble a rule-consequentialist who,
in contemporary parlance, has internalized the ideal moral code. This is because she would
almost always comply with the ideal moral code, the code that if followed by everyone would
make the world as good as possible.
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Rule-consequentialism has typically been motivated as a foil to maximizing act-
consequentialism.
Maximizing act-consequentialism. At any time, an agent is morally re-
quired to perform the best action. The best action is usually understood as the
action, of those available to the agent, that she could expect to maximize her
contribution to impartial aggregate wellbeing. If two or more actions are tied for
the best, any of these actions is permissible, but the agent is required to perform
one from the set of actions tied for best.
The objections to maximizing act-consequentialism are familiar. Among the allegations
leveled against maximizing act-consequentialism: it can require that we perform actions
we think are impermissible, such as murdering one person to redistribute their organs; it
requires too much of us, for example, demanding that we donate our wealth to curb deaths
from preventable diseases up to the point of marginal utility; it requires that we see our
personal projects through the lens of aggregate impersonal wellbeing and thus alienates us
from those pursuits that make life valuable; it is impossible to ever do more than is required,
as what is required is the absolute best action open to us; and so on.
In response to the veritable drubbing that maximizing act-consequentialism received in
the 20th century, alternative species of consequentialism multiplied and flourished. Each
of them can be seen as an attempt to improve upon maximizing act-consequentialism by
avoiding the objections above. These alternative species include, but are not limited to, so-
phisticated consequentialism, scalar consequentialism, satisficing consequentialism, systems
consequentialism, effort consequentialism, and rule-consequentialism.1
Rule-consequentialism is a form of indirect consequentialism, whereby our individual
actions are judged in accordance with some ideal moral code of rules, where that code of
rules is in turn judged by the aggregate wellbeing we could expect to result if the code were
1To be clear, this is not exclusively a species-level taxonomy: sophisticated consequentialism is a species
of maximizing act-consequentialism, and effort a species of scalar.
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internalized by all or almost all agents. All rule-consequentialist theories accept the following
two principles:2:
(1) An action is right if and only if it accords with an ideal code of moral rules.
(2) A code of rules is ideal only if its acceptance by some portion of the popula-
tion (usually at least the overwhelming majority of agents) would maximize
expected consequences.
The ideal moral code is typically described as forbidding agents from lying, stealing, and
harming others or their property, because we could expect the general observance of a code
forbidding such actions to maximize impartial aggregate wellbeing. Rule-consequentialism
allegedly avoids all of the objections leveled against maximizing act-consequentialism above:
The ideal moral code of rules is thought to cohere better with our considered moral intuitions,
e.g., it would not require that we murder one person in order to redistribute their organs
to others. It does not demand that we donate significant portions of our material wealth to
others who are worse off, at least not to the point of marginal utility. It does not require us
to see our individual projects, or any of our actions, through a lens of aggregate impersonal
wellbeing. And, finally, it is possible to go above and beyond what is required by the ideal
code of rules, as is explored in a later chapter here.
Rule-consequentialism can be justified in a number of ways. Some of its proponents have
argued that rule-consequentialism would actually do more to increase expected impartial ag-
gregate wellbeing than would maximizing act-consequentialism.3 This may seem obviously
false, given the formulation of act-consequentialism as requiring each agent to always per-
form the best possible action at a given time. From that definition, we might think it follows
analytically that everyone’s being an act-consequentialist would have better consequences
than everyone’s being a rule-consequentialist, since rule-consequentialism, as is well-known,
2I borrow this formulation from Kahn (2013).
3Harsanyi (1977).
3
can sometimes require agents to not maximize the good.4 However, rule-consequentialists
have offered several replies to this response. They may assert that everyone’s attempting
to be rule-consequentialists rather than act-consequentialists would be better. Second, they
have suggested that we restrict our discussion only to sets of action-guiding subjective rules
that are causally possible for humans. In which case, they continue, act-consequentialism de-
scribes a subjective rule it would be impossible to consciously follow; that consciously follow-
ing such a rule would have deleterious effects; and that, in any event, rule-consequentialism
is definitionally a theory of the optimific collection of habits, chosen from among those that
are causally possible for humans. The success of this response hinges on whether such a
restriction of our discussion is acceptable.
The parade of justifications for rule-consequentialism continues. Some have argued that
rule-consequentialism is justified by an appeal to contractualism, for example, it specifies
the set of moral rules to which all rational agents have the most reason to assent.5 Others
have supported rule-consequentialism as the most rational moral system for a society to
adopt.6 Others have argued that rule-consequentialism best satisfies a pluralism of theoret-
ical desiderata, for example, that it coheres well with our considered moral views, that it
identifies a fundamental, unifying principle of morality, and that it is useful in contentious or
difficult moral cases.7 Notice, of course, that these justifications are not exclusive, as shown
by Parfit’s Triple Theory, a version of rule-consequentialism which appeals to several of the
above justifications.8 Finally, some have argued that rule-consequentialism is justified by a
process of universalization9; I will argue along similar lines here.
4In fact, we might think it follows analytically that everyone’s being a maximizing act-consequentialist
would have better consequences than everyone’s following any other moral theory.
5Parfit (2011).
6Brandt (1979), Oddie (1998).
7Hooker (2000: especially pp. 1–31).
8It may be misleading to call Triple Theory a version of rule-consequentialism since it is ostensibly a
combination of three theories: rule-consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantianism. But Triple Theory,
plausibly, is extensionally equivalent to some formulations of rule-consequentialism and generates many of
the same moral rules as would rule-consequentialism.
9See Hare (1981; 1989b).
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1.1.1 Prospectus
Spurred especially by the recent publication of Derek Parfit’s highly anticipated On What
Matters, I believe rule-consequentialism is poised for a renaissance. Parfit’s work is a sig-
nificant contribution to rule-consequentialism’s ongoing convalescence after the dark night
brought on by the widespread belief in the success of the dilemma of collapse and incoher-
ence. Rule-consequentialism’s second act, currently underway, was prefigured by the 1990
publication of Brad Hooker’s article, “Rule-Consequentialism” in Mind, and was revealed
more fully in his subsequent book Ideal Code, Real World. Among other invaluable contri-
butions, this landmark work put to rest the dilemma of collapse and incoherence for good.
Rule-consequentialism has received new attention recently, both positive10 and negative11,
and the merits of new permutations of rule-consequentialism are being discussed.12 This
dissertation contributes to—and engages directly with many of—these ongoing debates.
This dissertation is a collection of articles that articulates a new theory of rule-
consequentialism, as well as arguing in favor of rule-consequentialism on other fronts. First,
in this chapter, I discuss two purported dilemmas for rule-consequentialism that have been
expounded by others: first, and more familiar, is the dilemma of collapse or incoherence;
second is the dilemma of utopianism or arbitrariness. I then introduce a new criticism of
rule-consequentialism, what I call its fundamental motivational tension. I give a new argu-
ment for rule-consequentialism as a theory of what a good person would do. It will turn
out that we ought to be the kind of person such that, if everyone were like us, the world be
as good as possible. I call this new theory situationist rule-consequentialism. Finally, I will
show this new argument for rule-consequentialism avoids the three criticisms just discussed.
In the second chapter, I show that rule-consequentialism is the only consequentialist view
that can accommodate the supererogatory in a way that is not ad hoc. This is because rule-
10Mulgan (2005), Woodard (2008).
11Eggleston (2007), Suikkanen (2008).
12See Ridge (2006); see Hooker and Fletcher (2008), Jenkins and Kahn (In draft) for responses. See also
Kahn (2012), Oddie (1998) for previous discussions of relative rule-consequentialism.
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consequentialism is the only consequentialist view according to which the supererogatory
is a genuine moral category, and where this results from some facet of the view that has
independent motivation. If we take the supererogatory seriously as a basic moral category,
then rule-consequentialism gains an advantage over its consequentialist rivals.
In the third chapter, I argue that some rule-consequentialists have good reason to be
moral relativists. There, I show how, for those who hold rule-consequentialism as a result of
a process of reflective equilibrium or out of a concern to maximize expected wellbeing, a form
of rule-consequentialism that prescribes different moral codes depending on, e.g., an agent’s
social group will be an attractive option. This is because allowing multiple moral codes to
be in force at the same time could plausibly make some people better off while making no
one worse off, satisfying both our desires to maximize expected wellbeing and cohering well
with our intuitions about costless benefits. In an appendix to the third chapter, I explore the
merits and demerits of individual relative rule-consequentialism, the most extreme version
of relative rule-consequentialism, according to which each person ought to follow the moral
code that would allow her to maximize her contribution to wellbeing over the course of her
life.
In the fourth and final chapter, I turn to the moral constraints on warfare. I argue
that the standard collection of constraints on the conduct of warfare, known as jus in bello
(“justice during war”) within the just war tradition, can be understood as a species of
rule-consequentialism. This is because the rules of warfare can be described as a set of
near-absolute constraints on the conduct of war, framed with reference to some overarch-
ing consequentialist goal. I suggest that the surreptitious consequentialist goal of the just
war tradition is the minimization of the horror of war. Thus we can unify the demands
of morality in warfare by appealing to a single overarching principle. Finally, I examine
the implications of this new unified theory for three contentious issues from the jus in bello
literature: supreme emergency, the doctrine of double effect, and the problem of noncompli-
ance. In an appendix to the fourth chapter, I explore the reasons we have for preferring a
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consequentialist account of the morality of war to the communitarian one that is preferred
by some prominent theorists.
1.2 Collapse and incoherence
Rule-consequentialism, in David Lyons’ words, is a child of two houses: consequentialism
and deontology. By occupying this space in the theoretical landscape, rule-consequentialism
claims some of the advantages of both genera of views, while also exposing itself to criti-
cisms. The most important of these criticisms is the dilemma of collapse and incoherence,
rule-consequentialism’s most persistent and pernicious criticism. The purported dilemma is
illustrated by the following case:
Imagine a situation wherein a rule-consequentialist could clearly maximize ex-
pected wellbeing by violating one of the rules in the ideal moral code, say, the
rule to keep one’s promises. It seems rule-consequentialism must require one of
two things of the agent: either (1) she ought to violate the rule in the name
of maximizing expected wellbeing, or (2) she ought to hew to the rule even
though it will fail to maximize expected wellbeing. If rule-consequentialism re-
quires (1), then rule-consequentialism collapses into extensional equivalence with
maximizing act-consequentialism.13 If rule-consequentialism requires (2), then
rule-consequentialism requires its agents to internalize an incoherent motivational
set. One the one hand, a rule-consequentialist is motivated by an overarching
desire to maximize expected wellbeing. On the other hand, she must at least
sometimes purposefully fail to maximize expected wellbeing, and instead act in
accordance with the ideal moral code.14 Either (1) or (2) must be true if rule-
13See Appendix A for a fuller discussion of some forms of collapse with regard to rule-consequentialism.
14The distinction between the rule-worship objection and this version of the objection from incoherence
is not clear, if it exists at all. Presumably, rule-worship is meant to be objectionable in virtue of its being
incoherent, or representing an incoherent motivational set. In a more extreme case, some critics allege that
rule-worship could result in disaster. This charge, that rule-consequentialism could allow “one-off” disasters,
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consequentialism is true. Since neither (1) nor (2) is acceptable, the theory must
be false.
This misguided criticism of rule-consequentialism can be traced to a central confusion
about the theory’s structure. Take the following statement of rule-consequentialism’s crite-
rion of rightness:
Formulation 1. An act is right if and only if it accords with the set of rules
that would make the world as good as possible if followed by everyone.
This statement of the theory is not drawn from any particular theorist’s work, but is
meant to be generic enough to capture the spirit of its mainstream formulations, like those
of Hooker and Parfit. It is only a short step from the above formulation to the following
formulation:
Formulation 2. If it is the case that if everyone were to perform action X,
then the world would be as good as possible, then I should perform action X
(even if I can be sure that everyone else will not perform action X ).
In this formulation, rule-consequentialism seems to phrase its commands as conditionals:
“If everyone else were to X, then you should X as well.” This is a natural enough rephrasing
of the first formulation above—natural, but mistaken. What this second formulation implies
is that the force of rule-consequentialism’s moral commands is bound up inextricably in a
conditional statement. Thus, the rule-consequentialist is left with two options, which I will
call the dilemma:
1. I ought to X just in case everyone else can be counted on to X.
has been answered previously. On Hooker’s formulation of rule-consequentialism, the ideal code includes a
clause that allows agents to violate a rule in order to avoid disasters (2000: 98–99). The justification for this
feature of the ideal code is the same as any other: a code which includes such a clause would have greater
expected consequences in terms of wellbeing, broadly construed, than a code that excluded such a clause,
other things being equal.
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2. I ought to X even though not everyone else can be counted on to X.
Neither of these options is palatable for the rule-consequentialist. Since we can often be
confident that few others will actually X, the first interpretation would render all of rule-
consequentialism’s moral demands practically moot. On the other hand, to demand that I
X even though others will not X, where the rightness of X ing is premised on a fact about
the consequences of everyone else’s X ing, is at best very confused and at worst incoherent.
It would be incoherent because it would be to think that an action is right only when certain
conditions obtain, namely, everyone else’s performing that action, but still that I ought to
perform that action regardless of whether those conditions actually obtain. In that case,
when the explicit ground of rightness is absent, how can we be confident that the action
would still be right?
This line of criticism can be traced to a mistake that takes place in inferring from the
first to the second formulation of rule-consequentialism above. That mistake is a misunder-
standing about the nature of the conditional statement involved in rule-consequentialism’s
criterion of rightness. I will call this mistaken interpretation the causal-dependence interpre-
tation of the conditional that is involved. The third formulation below makes this mistake
more clear:
Formulation 3. X is the action that, if performed by everyone, would make
the world as good as possible. Therefore, if and only if everyone else actually
X’s, you should X.
The third formulation makes clear what I call the causal-dependence interpretation of
the conditional in this generic statement of rule-consequentialism. In such a formulation,
the force of rule-consequentialism’s commands depends on some conditions obtaining. Con-
versely, when those condition do not obtain, the force of rule-consequentialism’s commands
melts into air.
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This would be a troubling result for rule-consequentialism. Luckily, it is mistaken. Below
I give a new argument for rule-consequentialism resting on an alternative understanding of
the fundamental conditional claim at the core of the view. First, I will discuss two new
problems of rule-consequentialism, which the new argument also solves.
1.3 Two new problems for rule-consequentialism
1.3.1 The dilemma of utopianism or arbitrariness
Recently, critics have pressed a new objection against rule-consequentialism that arises
from debates over the level of internalization for the ideal code of rules.15 Any code of rules
must be designed with a particular level of internalization in mind. One way of categorizing
species of rule-consequentialism is to sort them into theories that are premised on universal
internalization on the one hand16 and theories that allow for (and expect) some amount of
recalcitrance in the population.17 These codes will differ with regard to, at least and most
obviously, their instructions for dealing with scoundrels, thieves, and other rule-breakers.
This is because if the ideal code were universally internalized there would be no rule-breakers.
Thus a theory premised on the assumption of universal internalization would not need to
make prescriptions for dealing with noncompliance. Since the ideal moral code is meant to
be internalized, and humans can only internalize codes that are so complex, we ought to
capitalize on those unused psychological resources elsewhere in our theory.18, 19
15I owe much of the discussion here to Leonard Kahn in correspondence.
16See Harsanyi (1977), Parfit (2011).
17See Brandt (1992), Hooker (2000).
18See my third chapter for a fuller explication of the theoretical considerations arising from rule-
consequentialism’s sensitivity to the internalization costs of candidate moral codes.
19Some rule-consequentialists would object to our drawing this dichotomy between advocates of universal
internalization and “everyone else.” They might argue instead there is simply a question of what level of
internalization is best. This is true, and rule-consequentialists scarcely take their preferred level of internal-
ization to be the defining characteristic of their peculiar theory. But it happens that advocates of particular
levels of internalization can be so grouped, and there is nothing spooky or suspicious in this grouping. We
might just as soon discuss a scheme that divides rule-consequentialists into those who support 90% internal-
ization, like Hooker, and “everyone else” on either side of 90%. This categorization of rule-consequentialist
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Codes that are developed under the assumption of universal internalization are thus
subject to the charge of utopianism: they are designed for a perfect world and thus leave
out rules for dealing with noncompliance, free-riders, “deterrence and rehabilitation,” etc.
It would be folly to expect any code to enjoy universal compliance, so any code phrased in
this way would be unhelpful—and possibly counterproductive as well—in the real world, i.e.
now and around here, to borrow a phrase from Williams.
On the other hand, codes developed under the assumption of anything less than universal
internalization face at least two problems. First, all levels of internalization other than 100%
seem to many to be arbitrary. For example, Hooker develops his ideal code on the supposition
that it will be internalized by “the overwhelming majority of everyone, everywhere, in each
new generation” (Hooker, 2000: 32). But when pressed, Hooker cashes out “overwhelming
majority” as meaning 90% of people (2000: 80–84). As Hooker admittedly pulls this number
out of thin air, to critics the arbitrariness is palpable.20 Thus, the new dilemma for rule-
consequentialists of utopianism or arbitrariness.
It will be worthwhile to say just a bit more about arbitrariness. In order for a level of
social acceptance to be non-arbitrary, it must be so for either an intrinsic or extrinsic reason.
But there is no clearly no intrinsic reason why any particular level of social acceptance
is more choiceworthy than any other. One might suggest that there is something special
about universal, i.e. 100%, acceptance, and so it is a non-arbitrary choice. But we might
also think that 100% is simply one more number. The mere fact that a code of rules
would be internalized by everyone as opposed to 90% of everyone does not seem helpful
when determining whether the actions it requires and forbids are the morally right actions.
Moreover, in the familiar style of a sorites case, if it is arbitrary that a code would be
theories is granted for the sake of argument, since it is not obviously flawed, and seems to be just as principled
a distinction as any other categorization we could make among rule-consequentialists.
20See also Woodard (2008: 224–225). Jamieson and Elliot (2009) and others have lodged a similar com-
plaint against satisficing consequentialism. In response to this particular charge, Hooker and Fletcher seem
unmoved by worries about arbitrariness per se: “. . . we think the objection that focusing on any one rate of
internalization is arbitrary has very little force if the rules thus selected have no implausible implications”
(2008).
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accepted by 100% of society minus one person, then it’s unclear why getting this last person
to internalize the code should make a principled difference to the code’s plausibility or the
force of its moral requirements.
Turning to extrinsic properties does not seem any more promising. If rule-
consequentialism is justified by a kind of Kantian contractualism (Parfit, 2011: 377–380),
an appeal to universalizability makes some sense. But this is not how Hooker justifies
his form of rule-consequentialism (2000: 12–28, 99–102). Rather, Hooker appeals to rule-
consequentialism’s supreme coherence with our most deeply held moral beliefs. On this
count, it is not obvious that 90% social acceptance would yield more plausible rules for
behavior than another level of social acceptance.21
In addition to this charge of arbitrariness, theorists who phrase the ideal code in terms of
less than universal internalization have to contend with another objection. Suppose we agree
with Hooker that the ideal code should be formulated on the supposition of internalization by
90% of people. Imagine a world (or set of circumstances) in which this code enjoys any level
of internalization other than exactly 90% and suppose that the results would be significantly
suboptimal. This moral code’s authority is thus weakened, since it is “designed” for a world
unlike the actual world and, now and around here, its results are terrible. If that were the
case, the justification for this moral code would be seriously undermined.
The possibility of a world like this obtaining reveals the quixotic nature of the task
of fixing an internalization level. And for any possible internalization level we choose we
can duplicate this same problem: Codes phrased in terms of X % internalization may yield
terrible results if anything other than X % internalization is achieved.
Michael Ridge’s article, “Introducing Variable-Rate Rule-utilitarianism,” was instrumen-
tal in clarifying this new dilemma for rule-consequentialists (2006). Ridge argues that choos-
ing any particular level of internalization will be at best undermotivated and at worst disas-
21See Kahn (Unpublisheda: 14–15) for more on this point. I return a similar point later when I introduce
what I call rule-consequentialism’s fundamental motivation tension.
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trous. Ridge’s solution is to abandon the idea that candidate codes of rules must stand or fall
based on their expected consequences at a single level of internalization. Ridge substitutes in
place of these “fixed-rate” theories what he calls “variable-rate rule-utilitarianism.” Accord-
ing to variable-rate rule-utilitarianism an action is wrong if it violates the code of rules that
has the greatest expected benefit when its expected consequences are averaged across “ev-
ery level of social acceptance, between (and including) 0% and 100%” (Ridge, 2006: 248).22
This variable-rate theory has three advantages over the now obsoleted “fixed-rate” versions of
rule-utilitarianism that had been discussed heretofore. First, it is no longer vulnerable to the
problem of arbitrariness, since it jettisons its commitment to any particular level of internal-
ization, treating all of them as equally significant. Second, variable-rate rule-utilitarianism
is not utopian, since presumably moral codes that generate rules for dealing with noncompli-
ance will fare better than codes that do not when their expected consequences are averaged
across all internalization levels. Finally, generalizing from this second advantage, variable-
rate rule-utilitarianism will not fare poorly at any particular level of internalization, e.g.
100%, 90%, etc. (Ridge, 2006: 249).
Despite offering a solution to the dilemma of utopianism or arbitrariness, Ridge’s variable-
rate consequentialism has its own problems.23 First, note that Ridge’s animating concern
is the avoidance of arbitrariness in rule-consequentialism. But his theory falls victim to the
same problem in choosing ranges of possible internalization levels for evaluating. It would
be natural to evaluate codes of rules based on integer levels of internalization, for example,
at 99%, 98%, 97%, and so on. Yet this choice is clearly arbitrary, since we might as well
choose to evaluate that theory at 99.9% internalization, 99.8%, 99.7%, and so on, and there
22Ridge says we are to evaluate the expected utility of codes at all internalization levels, 0% through 100%,
inclusive. But calculating a code’s expected utility at a 0% internalization level would be otiose, since all
codes result in exactly equal levels of expected utility if internalized by no one. In this case we would simply
be measuring a kind of background rate of expected utility for the world. I suspect this is just an oversight
on Ridge’s part.
23These criticisms of Ridge have been developed in cooperation with Leonard Kahn, and are given in more
detail in Jenkins and Kahn (In draft).
13
is no reason for preferring one calculation over the other. If anything, we ought to prefer as
fine-grained a calculation as is practicable.24
There seems to be only one principled answer here and that is to calculate the expected
value of each code of rules at every possible internalization level. Internalization is a per-
sonal phenomenon, and therefore the atoms of internalization, if you will, for any given code
are individual people.25 So, in a society of 100 people—and only in a society of exactly
100 people—would it be appropriate to evaluate an ideal code of rules at the most natural
integer levels of internalization: 99%, 98%, and so on. In a society of 10 people, without
partial internalization levels, it would make no sense to evaluate a theory at, e.g., 94% inter-
nalization. In a society of seven-odd billion, as Hooker’s locution “everyone, everywhere,”
makes clear is his intent, running such a calculation would be practically impossible (2000:
32).
This theoretical problem with Ridge’s view has been solved, but has given way to an
epistemic problem. In fact, these worries seem to undo VRU’s central motivation. Ridge
puts forth his theory in part because of worries about our epistemic position with regard
to the level of social acceptance of any particular theory. But once the theory is examined
in detail it offers less epistemic certainty than before and in fact becomes unmanageably
complex.26 Rule-consequentialists have long been vexed by the epistemic problems entailed
24This is on the assumption that each individual ‘grain’ is equally epistemically likely, but we suppose this
for the sake of argument because it is plausible. See Kahn (Unpublisheda: 17–18) for more on this point.
25This assumes that there is no partial or fractional internalization within a single person. On the contrary,
we could conceive of partial levels of internalization that are determined by the likelihood that any particular
person will obey the ideal moral code on any given occasion. Suppose there are two people in the world.
Without partial internalization levels, the possible levels of internalization for the ideal moral code in this
world are 0%, 50%, or 100% in the cases where no one, exactly one person, and both people internalize the
code. However, we can also make sense of the scenario in which one of these people has the code perfectly
internalized, and the other has a rather weak allegiance to the ideal code, say, a 50% chance of following
it in any given circumstance. In this situation, we might say the code’s level of internalization is 75%.
While this is interesting, and exponentially increases the epistemic complexity of evaluating potential codes
of rules, it does not matter to the argument here or to VRU more generally: we are still to average the
expected utility over the range of all possible internalization levels, regardless of whether we countenance
partial internalization levels among individuals.
26Hooker and Fletcher (2008) express a similar worry, calling Ridge’s theory “too epistemologically de-
manding.”
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by the complexity of their theory, but we leave it to the reader to judge the seriousness of
these additional worries.
There is a second problem for variable-rate rule-utilitarianism that arises out of the
conceptual possibility of transfinite expected utility at some discrete level of internalization
for a code. Transfinite numbers are numbers that are larger than any finite number but not
themselves absolutely infinite. Suppose some code C at some level of internalization L is
expected to generate a transfinite amount of utility. Since a transfinite dividend divided by
any finite divisor yields a transfinite quotient, the total expected utility of C averaged across
all possible internalizations would itself be transfinite. Thus, the expected utility of C at
L would swamp the finite expected utility of any other code at any other internalization
level. In this case, C would win out against all other candidate codes in a comparison of
expected utility. This is problematic because transfinite expected utility might only obtain
at a single discrete level of internalization, say, at 58.283% internalization, while yielding
miserable results at every other level. But any negative utility at any other internalization
level, as long as it were finite, would also be swamped by the positive transfinite expected
utility of C at L.27 Moreover, even if C were dominated in terms of expected utility by every
other code at every other level of internalization, Ridge’s proposal would still require the
general internalization of C.
Third and finally, averaging the expected utility of a code across all possible internaliza-
tion levels yields a much less reliable result than measuring the expected utility of a code
at a particular internalization level. Suppose we evaluate a code at 80% internalization. In
this case, it is possible that society may reach an 80% internalization level, at which point
our estimate would have been correct. However, if we judge codes by their expected utility,
averaged across all internalization levels, it is much more likely that our real world results
27Hooker and Fletcher (2008) remark similarly that, “Ridge’s theory can be skewed by an anomaly”
at some particular level of internalization and that “an unusually high expected utility for a code at one
particular rate of internalisation could cause a high average expected utility for the code though it is poor
at every other internalization rate.” Hooker and Fletcher fail to appreciate the magnitude of the problem
generated by the possibility of transfinite expected utility in particular.
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would differ significantly from our estimates. Moreover, if we have any evidence at all about
what level of internalization is likely for a theory, then variable-rate rule-utilitarianism re-
quires us to ignore that evidence in our calculations. Suppose we are evaluating some group
of moral codes and we are very confident they are each likely to eventually enjoy an inter-
nalization level somewhere between 80% and 100%, say, because codes of similar complexity
and demandingness have enjoyed such acceptance in the past. Ridge’s theory demands in
this case that we evaluate each of these codes at internalization levels of 0% through 80%
inter alia, thus considering evidence that is unhelpful, distracting, or could skew the final
determination.
Ridge’s solution, the most prominent solution suggested to the nascent dilemma of utopi-
anism or arbitrariness, is unsatisfying. Below, I show how my new argument for rule-
consequentialism succeeds where Ridge’s solution fails.
1.3.2 Rule-consequentialism’s fundamental motivational tension
Consider the following two claims that Hooker makes about his rule-consequentialism:
(1) “[Rule-consequentialism] does a better job than its rivals of matching and
tying together our moral convictions. . . ” (2000: 101). That is, the ideal
moral code described by rule-consequentialism does a better job than any
other moral code of cohering with our most deeply held moral beliefs.
(2) The ideal moral code is the one “whose internalization by the overwhelm-
ing majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum
expected value in terms of wellbeing. . . ” (2000: 32).
The first of these is taken from Hooker’s response to the charge of incoherence, which only
goes through, he argues, if rule-consequentialism’s principal justification is the maximization
of expected wellbeing. The second of these is an excerpt of Hooker’s criterion of rightness.
Hooker means to refer to the same code in (1) and (2). Notice, however, that whether
rule-consequentialism really does do the best job of explaining and justifying our considered
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moral intuitions as he claims in (1) depends on the code referenced in (2). Less abstractly,
there’s simply no guarantee that the code that it would be best for everyone to internalize
really is the moral code that coheres best with our considered intuitions.
Determining the content of the ideal moral code of rules is a daunting empirical task. In
fact, the code that would maximize expected wellbeing if generally internalized might wildly
conflict with our deeply held moral views. It might countenance racism or slavery. After all,
other consequentialists have accepted that consequentialism could justify institutionalized
slavery, both if the world had turned out differently, and perhaps as it actually was.28
Hooker does not give us much reason to believe that (1) and (2) refer to the same code.
He does claim, and is probably right, that the two codes will have significant overlap and
both prohibit, for example, harming others or their property, stealing, telling lies, breaking
promises, and so on. Codes with these prohibitions would both (1) cohere well with our
considered moral intuitions and (2) make the world go well if internalized by the overwhelm-
ing majority of everyone, everywhere. But having significant overlap is a far cry from being
coextensive. What we need is good reason to think that the code that best coheres with our
considered moral intuitions is the same as the code that would make the world go best, were
it internalized by the overwhelming majority of everyone, everywhere.
According to Hooker, (1) is the best argument for rule-consequentialism. But the truth of
(1) is contingent on the code picked out in (2). Without a clearer picture of the code actually
picked out in (2), I suggest there exists in rule-consequentialism a fundamental motivational
tension. The version of the rule-consequentialism I develop below avoids the fundamental
motivational tension because it does not rely, in this way, on making two theoretical ends
meet.
28See Hare (1979).
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1.4 The new argument for rule-consequentialism
Recall that, above, I diagnosed the dilemma of collapse an incoherence as resting on a mis-
take about the nature of the conditional on which the force of rule-consequentialism’s com-
mands depends. If rule-consequentialism’s categorical commands depend for their strength
on the truth of a hypothetical, the antecedent of which we can be fairly confident will not
obtain, the rule-consequentialist may be in trouble. However, there is a second interpretation
of the conditional that underlies rule-consequentialism’s criterion of rightness. I will call this
second interpretation the universal interpretation. The universal interpretation of the con-
ditional underlying rule-consequentialism’s criterion of rightness is perhaps best appreciated
by considering the following argument for rule-consequentialism, which I will call the new
argument, where it makes an appearance in the fourth premise:
1. We ought to try to be good people. (Assumption)
2. A good person sets the best example for humanity with her actions.
3. So, we ought to try to set the best example for humanity with our actions.
(MP 1 & 2)
4. To set an example is to act while encouraging everyone else to follow your
action in morally relevantly similar circumstances.
5. The best example is the one such that, if everyone else felt encouraged to
follow it in morally relevantly similar circumstances, the world would be as
good as possible.
6. So, to set the best example is to act in a way such that, if everyone else
were encouraged to follow your example in morally relevantly similar cir-
cumstances, the world would be as good as possible. (MP 4 & 5)
∴ So,
Situationist Rule-consequentialism (SRC). We ought to
act in such a way that, if everyone were encouraged to follow our ex-
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ample in morally relevantly similar circumstances, the world would
be as good as possible. (MP 3 & 6)
1.4.1 The good person as setting the best example
Premises (2) and (5) in the above call for further defense. Why should it be that the
good person is one who sets the best example for others, and how are we to judge which
example is best?
It is already widely recognized that morality is universal such that the following claim is
true:
The moral status of an action in some set of morally relevant circumstances does
not depend on the identity of the agent who performs it.
This is to say that to make a moral judgment about some case is to commit ourselves to
the same judgment about any other case that is identical with regard to what Hare calls its
universal properties (1981: 21).29 Hare rejects the identity of the individuals that occupy
various roles, such as the agent and those affected by the action (see his 1981: 111), as well
as the place and time of an action, as universal properties. I will say more below about
precisely which properties are morally relevant for these purposes.
Notice this claim is incredibly weak, since it is compatible with many factors about
the agent making a difference to the moral status of her action, such as her intentions,
beliefs, or past history. Whether those factors can make a difference is a matter of debate
among ethicists. My concern here is not to settle this debate, but merely to advert to an
uncontroversial statement of what it means for morality to be universal.
One way of supporting the above claim about the universal nature of morality is to
consider its negation: “The moral status of an action in some set of morally relevant circum-
stances does depend on the identity of the agent who performs it.” It seems unreasonable
29For more on Hare’s notion of universalizability, see (1965: 12), and his essays “Objective Prescriptions”
(1999a: 13–14) and “Prescriptivism” in the same volume (1999b: 19–20).
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to assent to this claim, thus it is unreasonable to deny the first claim about the universal
nature of morality. If we are sympathetic to this negation at all, it is likely because we are
confusing an agent’s identity with her desires, beliefs, or other facts about her that are not
her identity and that—as I have already said—may be morally relevant.30
I suggest that a good person is one who takes morality seriously enough that she recog-
nizes and appreciates the above, and realizes that if she is taking morality seriously, that
what she ought to do is what everyone else ought to do in morally relevantly similar cir-
cumstances. Thus she cannot conscientiously act without endorsing a particular action in a
particular set of circumstances. This is the sense in which her action sets an example. Allow
me here to quote Sartre at some length:
. . . When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must
choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses
for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create
himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time,
of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. . . I am thus responsible
for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would
have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man. (1945)
What is incumbent upon an agent next is for her to choose her action carefully such that
it represents the best example for humanity. Where Sartre errs is in going on to argue that
no ethical system can provide an answer to the question of what I ought to do a priori, that
I must decide alone, and that the chosen action only has value in virtue of its having been
chosen. In this, he analogizes making a moral decision to creating a work of art:
. . . does anyone reproach an artist, when he paints a picture, for not following
rules established a priori? Does one ever ask what is the picture that he ought to
paint? As everyone knows, there is no pre-defined picture for him to make; the
30I am grateful to Leonard Kahn for suggesting this move.
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artist applies himself to the composition of a picture, and the picture that ought
to be made is precisely that which he will have made. . . It is the same upon the
plane of morality. . . We cannot decide a priori what it is that should be done.
(1945)
For Sartre, our moral judgments necessarily depend on our commitments and, as long
as we are sincere in choosing our commitments (i.e. as long as we are acting in good faith),
then our particular commitments are irreproachable. There is no overarching standard of
morality31 by which we might judge an individual’s commitments. But this surely seems
wrong: it cannot be that any choice having been made, even in good faith, just was the right
choice. Even granting that our moral decisions flow necessarily from our commitments, some
commitments are better than others—namely, better commitments are the ones it would be
better for everyone to share. Acting in good faith is not good enough: We must not merely
set any example in good faith, but set the best example.
To borrow from Hare again, when we act, we prescribe the same action for others in
similar circumstances. Thus there is a range of possible options we might choose, a range
of possible examples we might set, and a range of general patterns of behavior we might
endorse. It seems clear that these examples can be more or less choiceworthy. Examples must
be judged by their generalized outcome, i.e. by their consequences if generally followed.32
Hare provides a negative criterion for choosing which principles to universalize: he says
we cannot assent to any principle which we would not be willing to prescribe for others in
similar situations (1965: 89). But a positive criterion naturally suggests itself: Namely, that
the most choiceworthy example is the example it would be best to set for others. Since we
are to judge examples by their consequences if generally followed, the best example is the
31That is, besides the procedural, quasi-moral, existentialist standard of authenticity.
32In light of this, Hare defends a kind of preference utilitarianism: I ought to prescribe the actions that, if
universalized, would maximize the satisfaction of the preferences of all involved. While I cannot defend an
axiology here, my view is at least more permissive than Hare’s, and allows things besides peoples’ preferences
to matter in the calculus.
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one that would make the world go best if everyone in relevantly similar circumstances felt
pressure to follow it.
Thus, if I am taking morality seriously, I realize that I am endorsing a particular action
in a particular set of circumstances; I am setting an example for humanity. And the example
I set is apt when it is the one I would most prefer that everyone feel pressure to follow.
Finally, that must be the example that I could expect to result in the best consequences if
followed by everyone.
We should pause briefly here to consider examples of defective agency that seem to throw
this claim into doubt. Surely, there are people who act compulsively, who lament their state,
and who would not prescribe their behavior for others. Consider, for example, someone who
compulsively washes her hands every five minutes, or someone who locks and re-locks the
door ten times when she leaves her house. My first response is to note that these are not
characteristically moral actions, and thus they are not inconsistent with my claim about
the universal nature of morality above. However, there must be some people who, even
when performing more morally loaded actions, do not prescribe their action for others. This
may be either because they deny the very weak claim above about the universal nature of
morality, or because they are unable to act in accordance with their own moral judgments.
For those who simply deny the universal nature of morality, I have already said I find their
view untenable. For those who are unable to act in accordance with their moral judgments,
and thus unable to prescribe that their own behavior be generalized, I will simply note that
theirs is a standard case of akratic action, which threatens equally all normative views, and
does not pose a special threat to the new argument for rule-consequentialism. I cannot hope
to give a full discussion of akratic action here, but will only note that these people are usually
labeled defective for good reason.
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1.4.2 Is this rule-consequentialism?
Notice that the conclusion of this argument is only a decision procedure that tells us
what we ought to do in each individual circumstance. It does not prescribe rules of thumb,
or a plurality of duties, or any such thing. In this respect, it is much like the most naive
formulation of act-consequentialism discussed above, which is sometimes called direct maxi-
mizing act-consequentialism. Thus, situationist rule-consequentialism is admittedly a species
of direct consequentialism, rather than indirect consequentialism. Thus, it is not technically
a species of rule-consequentialism.
However, it seems that situationist rule-consequentialism is closely approximated by the
more familiar rule-consequentialism. This is because a situationist rule-consequentialist
agent could rely confidently on rules of thumb that largely resemble the kind of common-
sense morality enshrined in rule-consequentialism’s ideal moral code. It is plausible that
a situationist rule-consequentialist ought to refrain from stealing, lying, harming others or
their property, etc., because in most circumstances that will be the action that it would be
the best for everyone to feel encouraged to do.
While I admit that situationist rule-consequentialism is a species of direct consequen-
tialism I also feel that the label “situationist rule-consequentialism” captures the theory’s
nature well: each situation can be seen as the basis of an independent moral rule, and there
is not obviously some ideal optimific maximally compossible set of rules that should be
publicized and internalized. Another apt way to christen the theory would be as “example
act-consequentialism” where each action is judged by whether it sets the best possible ex-
ample in the circumstances. In the end, this question does not interest me, for the reasons
Hooker gives in his response to Howard-Snyder’s famous article, ”Rule-consequentialism is
a rubber duck.”33 If the charge is that a theory’s name is unilluminating or misleading, a
satisfactory response is to ask, after all, “What’s in a name?”
33See Howard-Snyder (1993) and Hooker’s response (1994).
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One might respond that this ambivalence points to a deeper problem with this new
theory, that there is a lacuna where the most basic foundation of the theory should be. Is
there no priority between acts and rules, according to situationist rule-consequentialism?
Actually, the priority of actions in this theory is clear, and the familiar ideal moral code
of rule-consequentialism becomes a kind of shorthand for the right action. In this light,
the theory again resembles a kind of act-consequentialism, which helps itself to “rules of
thumb” when recommending an action. There remains a notable difference between the kinds
of actions act-consequentialism requires and those that situationist rule-consequentialism
would require. And there is a notable constraint on action, according to situationist rule-
consequentialism, that also seems to disqualify it as a proper species of act-consequentialism.
(This constraint, as far as I know, is unprecedented in the act-consequentialist literature.)
Finally, the familiarity of rule-consequentialism’s structure and general commandments, and
its plausible status as a proxy for this new theory, recommends that name, it seems, quite
strongly.
Notice how the conditional nature of rule-consequentialism is visible in the new argument
but in a totally different form than the third (mistaken) formulation in §1.2. It is clear in
the new argument that the categorical moral commands of rule-consequentialism do not
depend for their force on the stipulation that everyone else is actually acting like you. The
third formulation errs by smuggling in a particular understanding of the relationship between
everyone’s acting a certain way and the action thus being right. As I have said, it is not
that everyone’s actually acting in the relevant way is necessary before I am required to act
that way, thus opening the door to the dilemma above. It is true, according to the new
argument, that an action is right because it’s the one that, if everyone performed it, things
would go best. But its rightness does not depend on everyone’s actually doing it. Rather,
this dependence is not causal, but rather ostensive—it is a claim that picks out a particular
pattern of behavior as the one it is best to set as an example, thus the one that is required
of me.
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It is implied by second horn of the dilemma above that there would be “no point” in
X ing if we could be confident that not everyone else will X. But this thought depends on
the claim that rule-consequentialism’s overriding motivation is the maximization of expected
welfare. Because rule-consequentialism’s overriding motivation is not the maximization of
expected welfare, we don’t need to worry about whether the pattern of behavior that we will
actually obtains. An alternative motivation is to act in ways that set the best example for
society; thus, to act in the way that if everyone were encouraged to act, the world would be
as good as possible even if everyone else doesn’t actually act that way.
Nor is the new argument an argument from pattern-based reasons, as in the recent work
of Christopher Woodard (2008). Woodard writes as if it’s obvious that we have reasons
to bring about a part of a good pattern, in itself, even when we can be confident that the
fuller pattern will not be realized. His motivating examples are activities like voting, i.e. “I
have a reason to vote even if it doesn’t affect the outcome of an election because my action
is a part of a good pattern.” Though this kind of reasoning is surely common, it’s also
surely controversial among philosophers. The ultimate problem with Woodard’s pattern-
based reasons argument for rule-consequentialism is that his motivating examples are no
less compelling than the central claim of rule-consequentialism, i.e. that I have reasons that
are premised on the hypothetical actions of others, even if we can be confident that others
will not act in the requisite way. Students of collective action problems can admit that
Woodard’s motivating examples are common, but insist that they are still problematic, and
problematic in the same way, and to the same extent, as rule-consequentialism’s fundamental
claim. Thus, Woodard relies on a premise that is no less obvious than the conclusion he is
trying to prove.
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1.5 How the new argument solves the new problems with rule-
consequentialism
1.5.1 The new argument and the fundamental motivational tension
The new argument for situationist rule-consequentialism given above avoids rule-
consequentialism’s fundamental motivational tension. The fundamental motivational tension
arises out of an incongruence between two claims that are important to rule-consequentialism.
The first is a claim about the justification for rule-consequentialism, namely, that it does
a better job than any competing theory of unifying our considered moral intuitions. The
second is a claim about the content of the ideal code of rules, namely, that the ideal moral
code is the one that we could expect to yield maximum consequences in terms of wellbe-
ing, impartially considered, if internalized by everyone. Thus the ultimate justification for
rule-consequentialism depends on the content of the ideal moral code.
Not all versions of rule-consequentialism separate the theory’s ultimate justification from
its content. For example, in my argument above, I do not motivate rule-consequentialism out
of a concern for justifying and systematizing our considered intuitions, though I find it very
plausible that situationist rule-consequentialism will indeed end up proscribing those actions
for the reasons Hooker gives. Of course, refraining from lying, stealing, and harming others
or their property as a general policy will do a better job of contributing to impartial wellbeing
than would a policy that allowed all of those. But my argument for rule-consequentialism
does not rest on this claim. Rather, in my argument for rule-consequentialism, both the
theory’s justification and its content flow from an agent’s setting an example, and her ra-
tional requirement to license those patterns of behavior that it would be best for every-
one to follow. There are not, in some sense, two independent motivations for situation-
ist rule-consequentialism. In fact, the fundamental motivational tension is only a problem
for versions of rule-consequentialism that separate the content of the ideal code from rule-
consequentialism’s justification. Whereas, for those other views whose content and justi-
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fication flow from a single principle—whose justification and content are indivisible, in a
sense—the fundamental motivational tension will not arise. My new argument above spells
out one such view.
1.5.2 The new argument and the dilemma of utopianism or arbitrariness
Recall the dilemma of utopianism or arbitrariness:
1. Every version of rule-consequentialism must premise the formulation of its
ideal moral code on either universal compliance or on less than universal
compliance.
2. Every version of rule-consequentialism that premises the formulation of its
ideal moral code on universal compliance is utopian: it provides no guidance
in cases of noncompliance.
3. Every version of rule-consequentialism that premises the formulation of its
ideal moral code on less than universal compliance is arbitrary : any level of
internalization that is assumed will lack a theoretical justification.
4. Therefore, every version of rule-consequentialism is either utopian or arbi-
trary.
5. If every version of a theory is either utopian or arbitrary, then that theory
must be false.
6. Therefore, rule-consequentialism must be false.
Situationist rule-consequentialism is premised on universal internalization of the ideal
moral code: it requires agents to set those examples that would be best if followed by ev-
eryone. Thus, we might expect this theory to be utopian: since it is premised on universal
compliance, it cannot contain any guidance for dealing with scoundrels. But situationist rule-
consequentialism can avoid the charge of utopianism by offering guidance in cases of noncom-
pliance, and thus show that the above argument is unsound, since its second premise is false.
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In fact, a version of rule-consequentialism can both (1) be premised on universal internaliza-
tion and (2) offer guidance in cases of noncompliance. Situationist rule-consequentialism is
one such theory.
Imagine that a situationist rule-consequentialist encounters a scoundrel, someone who
flouts the ideal moral code of rules. Recall that, according to my view, this agent ought
to act such that if everyone followed her example the world would be as good as possible.
An encounter with noncompliance just becomes one more situation where relying on this
decision procedure will be necessary. If this agent is faced with noncompliance or free-riding,
she ought to respond in the way that, if everyone felt encouraged to respond, the world would
be as good as possible. And, surely, there is some fact of the matter about the best way to
respond in the her circumstances. Thus, situationist rule-consequentialism is utopian in that
it is premised on universal compliance, but it also guides action successfully in situations of
noncompliance. In fact, all species of rule-consequentialism that are premised on universal
compliance can avoid the charge of utopianism as long as they can show that their moral
theory can yield a decision procedure to guide action in cases of noncompliance.
1.5.3 The new argument and the dilemma of collapse and incoherence
We might think that situationist rule-consequentialism collapses into act-
consequentialism. There are two ways this might happen, depending on an how agent
deliberates about a situation.
What matters here is the way in which we describe the example we are setting.34 For
example, I may tailor my particular example such that it applies to only situations that
are nearly exactly like the one I am acting under, describing the situation such that I could
expect it to be precisely duplicated rarely, if ever. Though I am forbidden from referencing
the identities of the people involved, or the place or time or the action, there are other
ways of describing a situation that are near-definite descriptors. I may reference the color
34Hare recognizes the same problem (1989a: 61).
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of the objects in my surroundings, for example, or the precise amount of money I have
at stake in some decision, or the brand of car I am driving at the moment, and so on.
In every situation, I could specify an example that, if followed, would maximize expected
consequences in situations exactly like this. Because we could expect this description to
obtain so rarely, there would be very little difference between saying that we ought to do A
in instances that are nearly exactly like this, and simply saying that we ought to do A in
this instance. If we performed such a procedure in every scenario we encountered, we would
simply be acting as act-consequentialists.
A related problem arises if we conceive of ourselves as act-consequentialists and describe
the example we are setting accordingly. For example, when asked to articulate the action
we are performing, we might simply respond that we are aiming to maximize our expected
contribution to impartial aggregate wellbeing. After all, if everyone followed that example,
in all situations, then the world would be as good as possible. This is a clear analogue to
the collapse objection to old versions of rule-consequentialism.
Situationist rule-consequentialism needs to thread this needle: as agents, we must see our
situations as a plurality of moral considerations, but not one so complex that we fall back
into act-consequentialism. The new theory can avoid these related collapse objections by
saying more about the proper way to describe the scenarios we are under and the examples
we are setting. Both of these questions can be answered by specifying which considerations
are actually morally relevant. An example will illustrate this. Imagine the following case:35
Mark is on his way to a lunch date when he sees a car that has run off the road
into a ditch. Slowing down, he sees an injured person slumped over the wheel.
Since this is a sparsely-traveled section of road, he’s confident that he is the only
one who has seen this car in some time. He knows that if he pulls over to help
this person, he will miss his lunch date, breaking a promise to a friend. What
should he do?
35This case is adapted from Ross (1930).
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Suppose Mark stops to help this injured person, which seems to be the obviously right
thing to do. Mark can consider his action under at least two different descriptions. First,
he might see himself simply as maximizing his expected contribution to impartial aggregate
welfare. Under another description, he might see himself as breaking a promise in order to
aid a stranger. Depending on which of these descriptions Mark adopts, it will set a different
example for humanity. If he adopts the first, he would encourage everyone to be an act-
consequentialist. If he adopts the second, he endorses a particular way of viewing the moral
universe as a collection of duties that sometimes conflict. From this second description,
Mark would be able to approximate his moral obligations by a rule-consequentialist code,
for example, one that contains rules of thumb that generally enjoin him both to keep his
promises and to aid strangers in need.
I believe we have several reasons for preferring the second of these descriptions to the
first. Since deliberating about a moral problem is simply one more kind of action, we can ask
ourselves which method of moral deliberation sets the best example for humanity. Accord-
ingly, I should deliberate in the way it would be best to encourage everyone to deliberate.
Hare says as much: that when choosing which features of a situation are relevant, we must
decide whether we could prescribe the general acceptance of moral principles that pick out
those features (1981: 89). Since I would be unwilling to generalize a rule that carved out an
exception for the day of the week, or the place and time at which an action was performed,
those considerations cannot be relevant to my deliberations. I cannot prescribe that everyone
deliberate in the same way.
There are further reasons for preferring the second method of deliberating. For one, it
is a more intuitive and commonsense way of viewing moral problems. It seems that the
moral universe naturally confronts us as a plurality of conflicting reasons rather than the
monism that act-consequentialism would have us adopt. It is simply unnatural to deliberate
as an act-consequentialist. When we consider whether to break a promise, tell a lie, harm a
person, etc., we consider conflicting presumptions on either side of a question. Moreover, it
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seems to me that a good person sees someone in need, or they see a promise to be kept, etc.,
rather than potential hedons waiting to be actualized.
For reasons that have been mentioned by others, it is an unwise strategy to encourage
everyone to act as an act-consequentialist.36 This is not only because we often lack the
relevant information about the consequences of an action and the time to deliberate carefully,
but also because we should doubt our own commitment to impartiality in weighing the
effects of our actions. Thus everyone’s being an act-consequentialist could have disastrous
consequences for the institution of promising, but also for our sense of security against theft,
harm, and deception. A world of act-consequentialists could be frighteningly unpredictable,
and this is sufficient reason not to encourage everyone to deliberate that way.
Finally, we ought not construct rules that are overly complex. This is because we should
want to avoid collapse into act-consequentialism for the reasons just surveyed. But also
because our methods of moral deliberation should be simple enough that we can have them
ready to hand at a moment’s notice. They should be as clear and specific as possible while
also being general enough to be easily internalized. Thus we should continue to deliberate
as a rule-consequentialist would have us deliberate.
Is situationist rule-consequentialism self-effacing, then? Is it somehow unpalatable to
hold that some features of a situation are (objectively) morally relevant, while also holding
that people ought not directly consider those features of a situation when deliberating? This
need not be problematic: consequentialists and other moral philosophers have accepted for
some time that it may not always be best to consciously deliberate about the goals of our
actions.37 Here is David Lyons:
Suppose we could, somehow, arrive at a general criterion of moral relevance for
the description of an action. Suppose also, however, that we can determine a
36See, for example, (Hare, 1989a: 63) and (Hare, 1989b: 188).
37This is clear when deliberating about our prudential reasons, as is the case with the subjective hedonist
in Railton’s “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” (1984). See also Norcross (1997:
391 ff.).
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criterion of relevance which is peculiarly suited to the application of a form of
utilitarian generalization [i.e. “what would happen if everyone did this?”]. These
two criteria need not be identical; they may conflict. If we wish to understand
utilitarian generalization, to grasp its peculiar import, we should apply such a
principle with a criterion of relevance which is implied by the principle itself,
whether or not such a criterion agrees with our notions of ‘moral relevance’.
(1965: 34)
I have been noncommittal thus far about the nature of the good. I suspect it is ultimately
grounded in the wellbeing of conscious creatures, but in some moods I also accept the intrinsic
value of other considerations such as friendship and desert. At any rate, whatever it is that
is morally relevant need not occupy an agent while she deliberates.
A critic may object that there are really two questions here, a metaethical question of
what natural facts are morally relevant and a moral question about what would make the
world turn out best. It may seem that I have mistaken the first question for the second:
I have appealed to expected consequences to answer a question about metaethics. But
this type of response has deep roots in rule-consequentialism, which grounds many of its
metaethical tenets in a claim about what would result if everyone had a certain set of
beliefs and motivations. Thus what is right and wrong simply is a result of some calculation
regarding peoples’ beliefs and motivations. Likewise, what is essential to making a moral
decision is simply a result of what set of beliefs and motivations, and patterns of reasoning,
would have the best results. Thus, an appeal to what is most natural and convenient, and
what would tend to have the best consequences, is adequate to ground this answer. At any
rate, the claim that what an agent ought to consider when deliberating is separate from the
question of what is morally relevant is familiar enough by now that I doubt it bears much
more elaboration.
Moving on, is situationist rule-consequentialism incoherent? It would be incoherent if it
were motivated by a concern to maximize expected wellbeing, but also sometimes required
32
agents to fail to maximize expected wellbeing. However, situationist rule-consequentialism
is not incoherent because it contains no overarching motivation to maximize expected well-
being. Recall that the central moral motivation for a situationist rule-consequentialist is to
set the best example for humanity, where the best example is the example that would make
the world as good as possible if everyone felt encouraged to follow it. There is certainly an
appeal to maximizing expected consequences here, but that appeal is constrained by a uni-
versalizing consideration. Thus the primary concern is to set an example, and from within
the class of examples I could set, I am rationally compelled to choose the one that would
make the world as good as possible.
Earlier in this chapter I admitted that situationist rule-consequentialism is a version of
direct consequentialism, albeit with a novel constraint on action. Given this, a critic might
spring the following rhetorical objection: “If situationist rule-consequentialism is not a ver-
sion of rule-consequentialism, then why should we laud it for solving these problems with
rule-consequentialism? Isn’t it mistaken to bill this theory as a new and improved version
of rule-consequentialism when it is not, strictly speaking, in the same genus? In fact, isn’t
the title of this entire dissertation misleading if you’re defending a version of direct conse-
quentialism?” My response is that situationist rule-consequentialism represents an appealing
alternative for those who are sympathetic to rule-consequentialism. Though a version of di-
rect consequentialism, situationist rule-consequentialism is, as far as I can tell, nearly com-
pletely coextensive with a standard version of rule-consequentialism. Thus its commands
boast the same intuitive plausibility.38 Moreover, it supplies the theoretical resources for
solving the problems with rule-consequentialism just discussed. Thus, if we are interested in
retaining rule-consequentialism’s intuitive appeal but uneasy about its theoretical problems,
situationist rule-consequentialism represents a clearly superior alternative.
38Where situationist rule-consequentialism diverges from standard rule-consequentialism, for example, in
dealing with noncompliance, situationist rule-consequentialism’s differences commend it.
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Situationist rule-consequentialism, as a fledgling moral theory, capitalizes on some of the
most appealing insights in the history of ethics. Namely, it captures the Sartrian notion
that when I choose, I choose for all mankind; that my actions implicitly endorse a pattern
of behavior for humanity; that I say, in a real sense, “This is how everyone should be.”
Situationist rule-consequentialism is admittedly complex, and it is unclear whether it is
practically empirically evaluable. In this way, it enjoys good company with nearly every
other moral theory worth considering: it seems the best we can do is to yield plausible
answers to difficult questions, while certainty will always elude us. Uncertainty is a fixture
of the human condition, of course, and we should not be surprised if it obscures our moral
deliberations. The best we may hope for is that quantum of clarity found in the knowledge
that with our actions, we do our best to present the noblest example of humanity.
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Chapter 2
Rule-consequentialism and the
supererogatory
Supererogatory actions are actions that, colloquially, go “above and beyond” the call of
duty.1 They are actions that are neither required, wrong, nor merely permissible. Typically
they are actions that go beyond what is required, count as “overscrubscribing” to moral duty,
or involve some significant personal sacrifice or risk that is admirable while not required.
The supererogatory is a fundamental moral category that we acknowledge in our daily
experience of the moral world. We appeal to the supererogatory when we describe actions
like a soldier falling on a grenade to save his comrades, or a doctor traveling a great distance
to help needy patients in the developing world. It would be unsatisfying for a moral theory to
label these actions as obligatory or merely permissible—in fact, it should count against that
theory’s plausibility. I suggest that any theory that deflates the supererogatory, provides an
error theory, or relegates it to a second-order existence is also worse off in a respect for its
inability to approximate our moral experience.
1The supererogatory itself is a perennially puzzling notion in ethics. For a discussion of its various species,
see Feinberg (1961). For a seminal exploration of the supererogatory, see Urmson (1958).
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The paradox of the supererogatory2 is that the concept of supererogatory actions high-
lights an uneasy tension between two fundamentally different moral notions: the right and
the good. Moral philosophers usually speak as if there are three categories of moral appraisal:
(1) Actions that are good to perform and bad not to perform (obligatory or
required actions).
(2) Actions that are neither bad to perform nor bad not to perform (merely
permissible actions).
(3) Actions that are bad to perform and not good to perform (wrong, forbidden,
or prohibited actions).
Supererogatory actions do not fit into this threefold classification, as they are typically
understood as actions that are good to perform but not bad not to perform. How could some
actions be good without also generating a moral duty? We normally think that there is some
essential connection between our axiological judgments of value and deontic judgments of
obligation, even if the order of explanation constitutes one of the fundamental disagreements
between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. But the supererogatory makes both
camps uneasy. While deontological theories have had some trouble accommodating the
supererogatory Baron (1987), Guevara (1999), Haydar (2002), the trouble is much more
pronounced among consequentialists. This difference seems traceable to the inclusion of
options in typical deontological approaches, which seem to be necessary for the possibility of
genuine supererogation. If more than one option is open to an agent, and one of the options
involves personal sacrifice in a way that is admirable, or involves oversubscribing to a moral
theory, then that action is plausibly supererogatory. Consequentialist theories typically deny
that there are options, unless two or more actions are tied for the best, in which case one of
them cannot pay out any more than the other. Here I will argue that rule-consequentialism
is alone among consequentialist theories in being able to accommodate the supererogatory.
2For discussion of this paradox, see Dreier (2004), Horgan and Timmons (2010).
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2.1 Consequentialism and supererogation
Consequentialist theories have traditionally had trouble accommodating the supereroga-
tory. Consider the most popular consequentialist theories on offer. According to maximizing
act-consequentialism, an act is right just in case its expected consequences are at least as
good as those of any other action available to the agent. According to maximizing act-
consequentialism, once an agent has performed the action that was required of her then, by
definition, there is nothing more she could have done. Since there is no difference between
the best (or most admirable) action and the action that is morally required, maximizing
act-consequentialism just has no room for the supererogatory.
Since, according to maximizing act-consequentialism, there are no supererogatory ac-
tions, some have objected that this theory is too demanding. In response to this and other
objections, Peter Railton has developed a new species of consequentialism called sophisticated
consequentialism. If sophisticated consequentialism has a single raison d’eˆtre, it is to avoid
the paradox of hedonism: It is widely believed that if a person directly aims at achieving
some goal, she will often frustrate her own efforts. Thus the best way of achieving some goal
is often not by aiming at it directly. This is the paradox of hedonism. Railton contemplates
an analogous worry for maximizing act-consequentialism: that aiming at the production of
welfare could result in less welfare being produced than if something else were the direct aim
Railton (1984).
But sophisticated consequentialism has other advantages. Maximizing act-
consequentialism is often alleged to be too demanding. We see shades of this objection
in the previous paragraph, where we are reminded that maximizing act-consequentialists
are on every occasion required to produce as much good as possible. Thus, there is noth-
ing they can do that goes “above and beyond the call of duty.” In addition to ruling out
the supererogatory, a maximizing act-consequentialist may also be overcome by a feeling
of alienation: alienation from her projects, from her loved ones, from the things that she
takes to give her life meaning. Maximizing act-consequentialism seems to require agents to
37
see her projects and relationships through the lens of aggregate impartial welfare: I ought
to abandon my projects, friends, and loved ones just in case they are not optimific. Many
find this demand callous and unacceptable. Sophisticated consequentialism is a species of
maximizing act-consequentialism that, according to Railton and others, makes a rigorous
consequentialism compatible with a more normal life. It does this by requiring an agent
to internalize a set of dispositions that could be expected to maximize her contribution to
impartial welfare over the course of her life, and these dispositions are allegedly compatible
with close personal relationships, personal projects, etc.
It may seem at first that sophisticated consequentialism allows us to live normal lives.
From this we might infer that it rescues the supererogatory, since we can go above and
beyond the call of duty in our normal lives. But looking beneath the surface reveals that
those actions that constitute a normal life are, strictly speaking, wrong actions according to
sophisticated consequentialism. This is because sophisticated consequentialism is ultimately
a species of maximizing act-consequentialism. Because sophisticated consequentialism is a
species of maximizing act-consequentialism, the right action in any particular instance is
the action that contributes the maximum expected amount of wellbeing to the world, even
though this is frequently not the action supported by the ideal set of dispositions. In this
somewhat bizarre fashion, even the scupulous sophisticated consequentialist must accept that
she frequently, or perhaps always, performs the wrong action. She merely denies that this is
blameworthy. So, supererogation is impossible according to sophisticated consequentialism,
despite first appearances. Nor can the sophisticated consequentialist say that there is some
better set of dispositions that could be internalized, i.e. a supererogatory set of dispositions,
since the set of dispositions that she is required to internalize is already the best possible
one. So much, then, for sophisticated consequentialism.
Satisficing consequentialism was developed in response to the same charge of demanding-
ness against maximizing act-consequentialism. On this view, an action is right if it produces
at least as much expected good as some baseline in some particular circumstance, i.e. just
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in case it is “good enough.”3 For example, suppose in some circumstance this baseline is
50 net units of expected wellbeing. Performing any action that produces 50 net units of
expected wellbeing would discharge an agent’s moral obligation. Any action that results in
more than 50 net units of expected wellbeing is supererogatory since the agent would have
done more than was required of her. Yet satisficing consequentialism entails moral judgments
that many theorists find wildly implausible.4 For example, suppose I am in a situation where
producing 50 units of welfare would be good enough according satisficing consequentialism.
But suppose I could also produce 100 units of welfare with no greater cost to myself. In this
case, if I fail to produce the better outcome, especially given that it is no more demanding
than an outcome that is “good enough,” I have done something wrong.
This charge underscores a flaw in the very structure of satisficing consequentialism: that
any line drawn between morally required and merely good enough is bound to be arbitrary and
unsatisfactory. Surely, there is some moral difference between producing 50 units of wellbeing
in the example and producing 49 units, but this small difference cannot ground the difference
between an action’s being permissible and being wrong.5 Satisficing consequentialism thus
accommodates the supererogatory but only at the cost of theoretical plausibility since its
accommodation is objectionably ad hoc.
One response is to move to incorporate other morally relevant factors into the determi-
nation of what counts as “good enough.” For example, what is good enough need not be
merely producing some level of expected wellbeing, but producing some level of wellbeing
given a host of other factors, including the effort and personal risk involved. To return to
our above example, the satisficing consequentialist might respond that it would be wrong
for an agent to fail to produce the better of the two outcomes given that she could produce
3For a defense of satisficing consequentialism, see Slote (1985). For a formulation of satisficing conse-
quentialism as a decision procedure rather than a criterion of rightness, see Simon (1966).
4See Hooker (2006: 239), which draws on Mulgan (2005).
5Norcross (2005b) agrees that there is no principled reason for specifying a ‘cut-off point’ between what
is forbidden and what is “good enough” in some circumstance. Jamieson and Elliot (2009: 244) note that
maximizing consequentialism at least has a principled reason for specifying the demands on agents: they
ought to produce what they expect to be the best world.
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either outcome with equal effort. However, satisficing’s central flaw of arbitrariness is still
present, since what counts as “good enough” for any particular level of effort, personal risk,
etc., will still be arbitrary. Supposing I am required to expend N units of effort to discharge
my moral obligations, we might as well as why it is N and not N − 1.
Finally, according to scalar consequentialism,6 there are strictly speaking no actions that
are morally required (or forbidden). Since there are no actions that are morally required,
there are no actions that go beyond what is morally required. Scalar consequentialism holds
that we have moral reason to perform some actions, and indeed more reason to perform
some actions rather than others. However, proponents of scalar consequentialism deny that
moral reasons for or against acting generate moral obligations and prohibitions. It thus
dispatches with our traditional moral categories of requirements and prohibitions. Scalar
consequentialists may hold that the categories of rightness and wrongness—and hence also
the supererogatory—are of practical significance, even if they are not fundamental moral cat-
egories.7 Thus, the category of the supererogatory contains “actions that are considerably
better than what would be expected of a reasonably decent person in the circumstances”
Norcross (2005b). Scalar consequentialism thus enables us to make true judgments that
some actions are supererogatory, but those judgments reduce to statements about our mere
expectations of an agent’s behavior in the relevant circumstance. This is troubling because
it mistakes the order of explanation: our expectations of an agent’s behavior in some cir-
cumstance are only justified if, in fact, supererogation is a real (mind-independent) property.
Scalar consequentialism risks building on sand if it defers to our expectations about others’
behavior with no further grounding. But that grounding can only come in the form of a prior
property of actions, i.e. that they are supererogatory. Mere expectations are not morally
important. For scalar consequentialists, the supererogatory is ultimately a linguistic con-
6See Norcross (2005b) for the canonical statement of this view.
7See Norcross (2005a) on the implications of this linguistic thesis for scalar and other consequentialist
theories.
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vention. If we wish to maintain that the supererogatory is instead as a fundamental moral
category, then scalar consequentialism must be rejected.
The problem is apparent. Maximizing act-consequentialism and scalar consequentialism
cannot accommodate the supererogatory. Satisficing consequentialism can but only by in-
curring a substantial theoretical cost. What is required of consequentialist theories is (i) to
allow room for the supererogatory as a genuine, basic moral category, and (ii) to do so in a
way that is neither arbitrary nor ad hoc, i.e. in virtue of some feature of the theory that has
independent justification. There are two ways to understand this second criterion, and sat-
isficing consequentialism fails under both understandings. First, we might mean a theory’s
bare ability to accommodate the supererogatory in a way that has independent justification.
Satisficing consequentialists might think they can satisfy the criterion under this understand-
ing: As Norcross (2005b) points out, satisficing consequentialism was developed in response
to three worries about maximizing act consequentialism. Those worries were that “(1) it
requires too much sacrifice of agents, (2) leaves inadequate room for moral freedom, and (3)
does not allow for supererogation.” I have argued that satisficing consequentialism avoids
this third problem, but satisficing consequentialists might point out that avoiding (1) and
(2) count equally well as motivations for specifying some baseline of moral obligation. Thus,
the theory’s accommodation of the supererogatory does have some independent motivation.
However, it should be noted—as Norcross does note—that these three worries are simply
facets of the general problem of demandingness : the claim that morality offers us options,
thereby affording us a degree of personal freedom, just is the claim that we are not always
morally required to do what would be best, which in turn implies the claim that there are
supererogatory actions. Thus, to argue along these lines that satisficing consequentialism
boasts three independent motivations for setting a baseline would be triple counting. But
we might understand the second criterion differently: perhaps it is not the bare ability of a
moral theory to account for the supererogatory, but rather its way of determining whether
any particular action is supererogatory. Above I argued that any particular baseline for judg-
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ing an action “good enough” will inevitably be arbitrary. Thus, satisficing consequentialism
illuminates both understandings of this second criterion in its varied ways of failing it.
None of the consequentialist theories discussed above can satisfy both of these require-
ments. Below I show that rule-consequentialism can meet both of them successfully.
2.2 Rule-consequentialism and supererogation
Rule-consequentialism refers to a family of ethical views that are committed to the fol-
lowing two principles8:
(1) An action is right if and only if it accords with an ideal code of moral rules.
(2) A code of rules is ideal only if its acceptance by some portion of the popula-
tion (usually at least the overwhelming majority of agents) would maximize
expected consequences.
Rule-consequentialist theories differ with regard to their understanding of acceptance9
in the above criterion and the specific level10. Formulated as above, rule-consequentialist
theories are also neutral with regard to their understanding of what makes the acceptance of
codes better or worse, i.e. their account of the good. None of these questions need concern
us here. Rather I will give an account of how rule-consequentialists, uniquely among all
consequentialists, and regardless of how they answer these questions of formulation, can give
a satisfactory account of the supererogatory.
The claim that rule-consequentialism can accommodate the supererogatory is immedi-
ately confronted with a problem: if actions are already judged by some optimal standard of
8I borrow this formulation from Kahn (2013).
9For some, acceptance of a rule just is successful compliance with a rule, i.e. always obeying a rule.
More popular nowadays is the view that acceptance of a rule implies the formation of a more complicated
multi-track disposition to want to obey the rule because it is the rule, to encourage others to obey the rule
and discourage them from breaking it, to feel good when following a rule and guilty when breaking it, etc.
10For theorists who formulate the ideal code of rules in terms of universal acceptance, see Brandt (1979),
Harsanyi (1977), Parfit (2011). For theorists who formulate the ideal code of rules in terms of less than
universal, but still overwhelming, acceptance, see Hooker (1990; 2000). For discussion of the problems facing
either approach, see Jenkins and Kahn (In draft), Kahn (Unpublishedb), Ridge (2006).
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morality—in this case, their coherence with the ideal moral code—then how can any action go
beyond what is required? No action could be better than what the ideal code required: if an
action differs from what the ideal code requires, that action must violate the ideal code, and
must therefore be wrong. Hence, rule-consequentialism seems to squeeze the supererogatory
out of the picture in the same way that maximizing act-consequentialism does. I will call
this the obvious problem regarding supererogation for rule-consequentialism, or the obvious
problem for short. This analogy is perhaps clearer between rule-consequentialism and so-
phisticated consequentialism, since the two theories require agents to act from an ideal set of
dispositions. One difference between these two theories—their criteria of rightness—is crucial
for rescuing rule-consequentialism from the same fate as sophisticated consequentialism.11
One response is this: According to rule-consequentialism, an action is supererogatory any
time it would have better expected consequences than the action required by the ideal code of
rules. But supererogatory actions, at the very least, are praiseworthy actions, and praising
agents who violate the ideal moral code in the interest of maximizing expected consequences
threatens to reintroduce the specter of collapse. This is surely dangerous ground for rule-
consequentialists, who have labored diligently in the past to avoid falling into this particular
trap.12
Both a closer examination of the supererogatory and a closer examination of the structure
of rule-consequentialism are in order. Only after both will we see how this proposed solution
fails and how rule-consequentialism avoids the obvious problem.
This proposed solution errs in assuming that the best understanding of supererogatory
acts is that they contribute to the general welfare to some degree that is over and above
what is required by agents. But this is mistaken, for supererogatory acts are more obviously
11These theories are contrasted in greater detail in Appendix A.
12Strictly speaking, this objection differs from the traditional collapse objection. That objection says
that rule-consequentialism collapses into equivalence with act consequentialism in the actions it requires and
forbids. The objection I press here does not regard rightness but rather supererogation. Still, this objection
bears a striking resemblance to the collapse objection, since its point is that rule-consequentialists should be
loath to endorse a moral code that would result in practical equivalence with act consequentialism.
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those that involve enduring significant personal sacrifice or risk,13 in ways that are morally
admirable. Take for example the following case, inspired by a case found in Urmson’s
canonical article (1958):
Doctor. Imagine a medical doctor who works in the United States. One day,
she hears of an epidemic threatening a village in sub-Saharan Africa. Moved by
the plight of the people there, the doctor suspends her practice in America and
flies to Africa to help treat the victims of the epidemic.
We intuit that this doctor has done something supererogatory.14
In investigating whether rule-consequentialism can accommodate the supererogatory, we
should ask whether the theory could coherently account for our most deeply held beliefs about
that category of actions. Since our intuitions pick out admirable personal sacrifice or risk as
the essential features of supererogatory actions, we should ask whether rule-consequentialism
can make sense of those features. Here is how it can:
On rule-consequentialism, supererogatory acts are those that
(1) Involve significant personal sacrifice or exposure to significant personal risk,
where significant is understood as going beyond what is required by the
ideal moral code,
(2) Do so in a way that is admirable, and
(3) Do not violate any rule in the ideal moral code.
13It has been suggested to me that risk could be subsumed under sacrifice since, in risking her fortune or
wellbeing, a person sacrifices her security, or lowers her expected future wellbeing.
14Likewise, take the following story from my own experience: While walking to the bar one night through
a residential neighborhood, I passed a car whose dome light was on. If left on all night, the car’s battery
would likely be dead in the morning. I approached the house nearest where the car was parked and notified
the woman who answered the door. But this was not her car. I looked around and it was not immediately
obvious in which house the car’s owner lived. Moreover, there were two or three apartment complexes
immediately nearby, and I was not about to knock on 20 doors on my way to the bar. So, I walked on. My
action seemed supererogatory and the woman with whom I spoke, while it was not her car, praised me more
than once for doing something “awfully nice” (presumably a folk term for supererogatory). This is plausibly
because the expected consequences of my action were high, even if the consequences that obtained were lower
than if I had not knocked on the door, since it inconvenienced both me and the woman with whom I spoke.
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The first criterion above captures the conceptual core of the supererogatory: doing more
than is required or, literally, paying out above what is required. The second criterion is
meant to preempt worries about the wrong kind of sacrifice, such as pointless or even vicious
sacrifice. As Feinberg (1961) points out, mere sacrifice cannot be enough to make an action
supererogatory. This example of his is excellent, if dated: Suppose someone approaches
me on the corner and asks me for a match. In return, I give him two matches. Though
this involved overpaying in a way that leaves me worse off than is strictly required, this
action is not supererogatory, only odd. Moreover, agents can sacrifice in ways that are
not admirable, but are pointless. For example, suppose that in some circumstance it is
admirable for me to visit my aunt in the hospital—suppose she lives several cities away. I
could sacrifice by biking to the hospital rather than driving. But such sacrifice does not make
my action supererogatory, only wasteful. It is true that I endure greater sacrifice than I would
have if I had driven my car, but the sacrifice is totally frivolous and not admirable. Thus,
choosing to bike rather than to drive does not make my action supererogatory. Feinberg
also contemplates “supererogatory villains,” if such a label is even coherent, who are extra
villainous (Feinberg, 1961: 282). Both considerations show that in order for my action to
be supererogatory, the sacrifice involved must be positively admirable. The third criterion
above is entailed by the second since an action is admirable only if it does not violate the
ideal code of rules. For clarity that entailment is made explicit in the third criterion.
For rule-consequentialists, the heuristic for determining whether a candidate rule belongs
in the ideal moral code is to ask, “What would the world be like if everyone felt compelled
to follow this rule?” (Hooker, 2000: 5). The account of the supererogatory given above fits
neatly into this characterization. Recall that supererogatory acts are those that are admirable
yet not required. According to the ideal moral code, some amount of personal sacrifice is re-
quired, for example, in donating to aid organizations in the developing world. Universalizing
a rule that would require greater sacrifice than this could very clearly have counterproductive
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consequences.15 For that reason, according to rule-consequentialism, agents ought not feel
as though they are required to endure greater personal sacrifice for the sake of those who are
worse off. On the other hand, great personal sacrifice is not strictly forbidden by the ideal
code of rules, and so is permissible. This is perhaps the clearest example of “oversubscribing”
to one’s moral duty. Finally, supererogatory acts are admirable only if the agent assumes
great personal sacrifice or risk in the pursuit of otherwise morally permissible goals. Thus,
rule-consequentialism can accommodate supererogatory actions as those that go beyond the
ideal code in terms of admirable personal sacrifice without explicitly violating any of its
rules.
2.2.1 Rule-consequentialism and options
Above we noted that maximizing act-consequentialism simply has no room for the su-
pererogatory. This is because there are no actions that are better than what is required—and
if some action is better than what is required in terms of personal sacrifice, then it will likely
be suboptimal and so forbidden. Maximizing act-consequentialism requires the agent to per-
form the action with the best expected consequences and thus does not provide options for
an agent.16
Rule-consequentialism differs from maximizing act-consequentialism because it accords
options to the agent. Consider the following two candidate rules:
(R1) Each person who is at least moderately well-off is required to donate exactly
10% of her income to charity.
15See Carson (1991), Hooker (1991), and especially Hooker (2000: 152–158). Witness also Peter Singer’s di-
minishing demands on agents for giving to charity. In his (1972), those demands only ceased when agents had
reached the point of diminishing marginal utility. In his (1982: 246) Singer analogized charity to the Christian
requirement to tithe, and so suggested agents donate 10% of their income to charity. Singer’s most recent and
ongoing work on the topic, including his (2010) and its accompanying website, www.thelifeyoucansave.com,
asks that we donate only 1% of our income to charity.
16See McNaughton and Rawling (1998), which argues that offering options is perhaps one of the distinctive
features of deontology (along with agent-relative reasons and constraints). Strictly speaking, there is one kind
of case in which maximizing act-consequentialism allows an agent to choose between one or more options,
and that is a case wherein two or more options are tied for the best in terms of expected consequences. As
discussed above, though, this does not really allow room for the supererogatory.
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(R2) Each person who is at least moderately well-off is required to donate at least
10% of her income to charity.
We may call the first rule definite and the second rule open-ended. If the ideal moral code
contains only definite rules, then the obvious problem with rule-consequentialism will obtain:
It will be impossible for an agent to do more than what the ideal moral code requires without
at the same time violating the ideal moral code, and so there would be no supererogation.
If—and only if—the ideal moral code contains at least some open-ended rules will it be
possible for an agent to act in a way that is supererogatory. (This is, again, only if they do
not in the process violate some other rule in the ideal moral code, for example by undermining
their abilities to discharge their financial obligations to their dependents.)
It is nearly certain that the ideal moral code will contain at least some rules that are
open-ended rather than definite. A rule regarding charity, listed as (R2) immediately above,
is an open-ended candidate moral rule that we can be very confident will be included in the
ideal moral code. This is for two reasons. First, we could expect the world to turn out better
if everyone internalized a moral code containing (R2) rather than (R1). This is because a
code containing (R1) rather than (R2) explicitly forbids an agent from donating more than
10% of her income to charity, while (R2) leaves this open. Thus it is implausible that a
society of agents having internalized (R2) would donate less to charity than a society having
internalized (R1). Second, (R2) does not obviously have a higher psychological cost than
(R1), since the two rules make identical minimum demands on the agent and leave it open to
her whether to donate more than 10% of her income. Thus, it is extremely implausible that
the internalization of a moral code containing (R2) would have worse expected consequences
than a code containing (R1) instead; in a sense, there is nowhere for the expected conse-
quences to go but up. Now we can appreciate why the obvious problem rests on a mistake:
it assumes that all the rules in the ideal moral code are definite rather than open-ended.
But this is almost certainly wrong.
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2.2.2 Relative rule-consequentialism and the supererogatory
A new species of rule-consequentialism called relative rule-consequentialism has attracted
attention recently.17 According to relative rule-consequentialism,
(1) An action is wrong for an agent to perform if it is forbidden by the code of
rules to which she is subject.
(2) An agent is subject to a code of rules if and only if her being subject to
that code of rules is in accordance with the ideal arrangement of all codes
of rules.
(3) An arrangement of codes of rules is the ideal arrangement of all codes of
rules if and only if it is the arrangement that would have maximum expected
consequences in terms of wellbeing.
A full explication of relative rule-consequentialism is a project for another time.18 For
such an explication to be satisfying, it would at least have to give some general idea of
the boundary lines between codes. Are codes to be relativized according to differences in
intellectual capacities, innate altruistic motivation, national boundaries, “social groups,” or
some other determinant (or combination thereof)?
According to relative rule-consequentialism, different moral codes may contain different
obligations regarding charity, for example. If this is true, then which actions count as
supererogatory will also be determined by each individual code. It will be easier for an agent
to perform a supererogatory act if the code that governs her behavior is less demanding to
begin with. So, it may be that agents with, for example, lesser innate psychological capacities
or more self-interested dispositions could perform actions that would be supererogatory for
them while not being so for others who fall under the purview of a different ideal moral code.
17While relative rule-consequentialism has been entertained since at least Brandt (1979), it has only re-
cently attracted serious attention (see Kahn (2012), Oddie (1998), and the third chapter of this dissertation).
18See the third chapter of this dissertation, which argues that rule-consequentialists of certain stripes have
good reason to relativize the ideal moral code to societies.
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Whether this outcome is objectionable likely depends on the contours of the various
ideal codes in force at once. We may think it is perfectly reasonable that someone with a
strong natural reluctance to sacrificing for others ought to be praised when they donate a
middling amount to charity since, for them, the action was performed only after significant
psychological exertion. Thus, psychological or mental characteristics might constitute some
of the less objectionable grounds for distinguishing between the moral obligations of different
groups of agents.
We may think it is “reasonable” to praise a more stingy person because it was “only
fair.” But in another sense, a deep understanding of someone’s character might lead us
to say that their action really was more praiseworthy. Suppose we consider our obligation
to give to charity in absolute numbers. Then, it would be reasonable to praise the person
working three minimum wage jobs for giving $100 to charity much more than we would
praise a millionaire for doing the same. This is because it’s actually much more difficult for
the former. We accept this kind of relativity without question in these cases, and this is why
we are tempted to move to a percentage-based rule regarding charity to begin with. From
here it’s a fairly short step to saying that someone who finds it naturally hard to behave
well should receive more praise. If we shape our institutions of praise and blame in part by
reference to consequentialist goals, then it might be best to praise people who find it difficult
to do the right thing more emphatically than we praise those who would find the same act
easier, since we could expect this general policy to produce more wellbeing.
On the other hand, any suggestion that we draw this line based on national boundaries—
similarly, ethnic or racial boundaries—is likely to encounter significant resistance. Ulti-
mately, whether relative rule-consequentialism’s handling of the supererogatory is objection-
able depends on features of the theory that will have to remain unsettled for now.
Strictly speaking, we act in accordance with the ideal moral code any time we do the
bare minimum, i.e. the least amount required of us. Taking examples (R1) and (R2) above,
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this means we would discharge our duty of charity any time we donate (merely) 10% of our
income. And many agents are like this; they are minimally decent rule-consequentialists.
But we ought to distinguish these agents from those who routinely go above and beyond,
who are saintly rule-consequentialists, and who distinguish themselves even in a world of
good people.
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Chapter 3
Rule-consequentialism and two forms
of moral relativism
Rule-consequentialism determines the rightness of actions by reference to some ideal code
of rules which is generally taken to apply to all (or almost all) agents. This is true in its
canonical formulations, for example, Brandt (1979), Harsanyi (1977), Hooker (2000), and
Parfit (2011). Relativized forms of rule consequentialism, which specify different moral rules
for different social groups, have been considered before1, yet they have not received serious
attention until recently.2 Here I argue that, depending on their theoretical motivations, some
rule-consequentialists have very good reasons to be relativists. Namely, rule-consequentialists
who find compelling the theory’s coherence with our considered moral intuitions and are
moved by consequentialist considerations ought to support a scheme of multiple relativized
moral codes.
I take Hooker’s view of rule-consequentialism to be a paradigm of contemporary rule-
consequentialism, though what I say applies to any rule consequentialists who share his
motivations. Moreover, my discussion exposes a startling inconsistency in Hooker’s view,
1See for example Brandt (1979: 194) and Hooker (2000: 189).
2See especially Kahn (2012). See Oddie (1998) for an earlier discussion.
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which already countenances one kind of moral relativism, namely one according to which
the rightness of actions can change over time, but vigorously rejects the kind being defended
here.
3.1 Four Worlds
All rule-consequentialist theories accept the following two principles:3:
(1) An action is right if and only if it accords with an ideal code of moral rules.
(2) A code of rules is ideal only if its acceptance by some portion of the pop-
ulation (usually at least the overwhelming majority of agents) would have
the best expected consequences.
A necessary component of any plausible candidate for the ideal moral code is a rule
requiring some people to donate to charity. This is because the general acceptance of a code
that includes such a rule would almost certainly result in better expected consequences than
any code that lacked such a rule. How should this “rule regarding charity” function in the
ideal code?
Imagine the following world:
World 1. In this world, the moral code includes a rule requiring everyone to give
10% of their annual income to charities that benefit the least well off in society.
The code in force in this world seems suboptimal, since it requires everyone, even those
who are poor, to donate 10% of their income to charity. For the worse off in society, this
would constitute a significant economic burden, and may end up making them even worse
off. As a result, this rule is self-defeating and may end up making the world worse than if
this rule were left out. This code cannot be the ideal code.
3I borrow this formulation from Kahn (2013).
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The rule regarding charity will be self-defeating in this way only if our moral theory holds
that the rich and poor are under identical obligations to give to charity. However, they are
not. One way of avoiding this problem, then, is to craft a code of rules according to which
our obligation to donate to charity is conditional on our being rich. Suppose that we move
from World 1 to the following world:
World 2. In this world, the moral code includes a conditional rule specifying an
obligation to give to charity. The rule is to be phrased in roughly the following
way, “If you are at least moderately well off, you ought to donate 10% of your
income to charity.”
The code in force in this world is morally better than the one in force in World 1 because
its rule regarding charity requires agents to donate to charity only if they can afford to do so.
As a result, it is not self-defeating, and we can expect World 2 to contain greater aggregate
wellbeing than World 1. In fact, we can expect at least some in World 2 to be better off
than they were in World 1 while no one is worse off.4
Including conditional rules in the ideal moral code is one way of capitalizing on the
benefits of moral relativism without bearing the alleged theoretical costs. Some philosophers
have pointed out that accepting moral relativism could do even more to promote wellbeing
than teaching a single, universal code of rules, even one that includes conditional rules.5
Imagine the following world:
World 3. World 3 contains all the same agents as World 2. However, in World
3, society is to be divided along socioeconomic lines such that the at least mod-
erately well off are to internalize one moral code—the “Rich Code”—and the
poor are to internalize a different moral code—the “Poor Code.” The Rich Code
4Hooker proposes this very solution at (2000: 87).
5Kahn (2012) gives two concrete examples of how this might be. His first example involves different
populations spread across causally isolated possible worlds; his second involves causally isolated populations
in the same world (2012: 7–10). I argue below that these conclusions likely hold even when considering
agents who are not causally isolated. See also Kagan (2000), Mulgan (2005), Parfit (1984).
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and the Poor Code differ in exactly one respect: the Rich Code requires its
adherents to donate 10% of their income to charity; the Poor Code makes no
demands regarding charity. As a result, Worlds 2 and 3 contain identical agents
who are engaged in identical patterns of behavior and who have identical levels
of wellbeing. (For the time being, I ask that we bracket the possibility of social
mobility.)
If we are comfortable with moving from World 1 to World 2, then we must be comfortable
with relativized patterns of behavior among agents, for in World 2, agents are effectively asked
to act differently depending on their level of wealth. World 2 and World 3 are also identical in
this regard, i.e. from the outside. Their differences become apparent only when we look more
closely. There, we see that two individuals could be under the jurisdiction of two distinct
moral codes, not just that they could variably satisfy the antecedent of some conditional
rule. Yet it would be odd to suggest that for this reason World 3 is morally worse than
World 2. By hypothesis, these worlds contain identical agents who are engaged in identical
patterns of behavior and who have identical levels of wellbeing. In fact, it seems that World
3 is not worse than World 2.
Finally, imagine the following world:
World 4. World 4 is identical to World 3, except that in World 4, the Poor Code
differs from the Rich Code in the following way: rather than simply removing a
rule regarding charity from the Poor Code, we instead substitute a new rule in
its place.
In World 3, the Poor Code differed from the Rich Code merely in lacking one of the Rich
Code’s rules. But removing a rule from the Poor Code leaves some psychological resources
unused as the poor are required to internalize one less rule. In World 4, we capitalize on
these unused psychological resources by including in the Poor Code a new rule. The move
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from World 3 to World 4 promises to make at least some better off while making no one
worse off. Here is how:
For rule-consequentialists, the expected value of everyone’s internalizing a code is a func-
tion in part of the psychological cost of internalizing the code. This psychological cost in turn
is a function of a code’s size (i.e. number of rules), complexity, and distance from humans’
natural tendencies (e.g. codes that are more demanding are more difficult to internalize).
The expected consequences of everyone’s internalizing a code is a function in part of the size
and complexity of a code because a code that contained more fine-grained rules pertaining
to the variety of moral situations we are likely to encounter would better equip an agent to
maximize her contribution to wellbeing. Thus, it is almost always a suboptimal strategy for
a code of rules to leave some psychological resources unused: aggregate welfare could almost
always be increased by adding an additional rule to the ideal code.
The poor clearly have a reduced psychological burden in World 3 compared to World
2 because the Poor Code has one fewer rule while being otherwise identical to the Rich
Code. The rich also plausibly have a reduced psychological burden because internalizing an
unconditional rule is simpler than internalizing (and applying) a conditional rule. At any
rate, the psychological burden on the rich is surely not higher in World 3 than it is in World
2. Hence, the total psychological cost is pareto reduced in World 3 compared to World 2.
No one incurs a higher psychological cost and, because the same patterns of behavior that
Hooker endorses in World 2 obtain in World 3, there is no change in the aggregate welfare
in the world.
The Poor Code in World 3 leaves some psychological resources unused. We could make
use of these newly freed up psychological resources by adding an additional rule to the Poor
Code regarding, e.g., the treatment of other people or their property. If we are careful in
designing this new addition to the Poor Code in World 4, its inculcation by part of society
would plausibly make the world better off. Thus, fully embracing synchronic moral relativism
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in World 4 more efficiently uses the available psychological resources in society and thereby
makes the world better off for some while making it worse off for no one.
Thus, we have an argument for adopting relative rule-consequentialism, the theory in
place in World 4:
1. World 2 is preferable to World 1.
2. World 3 is not worse than World 2.
3. World 4 is preferable to World 3.
∴ 4. World 4 is preferable to World 1.
According to relative rule-consequentialism,
(1) An action is wrong for an agent to perform if it is forbidden by the code of
rules to which she is subject.
(2) An agent is subject to a code of rules if and only if her being subject to
that code of rules is in accordance with the ideal arrangement of all codes
of rules.
(3) An arrangement of codes of rules is the ideal arrangement of all codes of
rules if and only if it is the arrangement that would have maximum expected
consequences in terms of wellbeing.
3.2 Objections
Below I consider objections to premises (1) and (2). I do not anticipate objections to
premise (3). Some brief preliminaries will be helpful before considering these objections.
According to Hooker’s formulation of rule-consequentialism,
An act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by
the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has
maximum expected value in terms of wellbeing. . . (2000: 32)
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Notice that Hooker’s criterion of wrongness is consistent with the following position:
Diachronic moral relativism. The moral status of an action depends in part on
the time at which it is performed.
Hooker does not hold that the time at which actions are performed matters in itself.
Rather, he holds that the moral status of an action may differ between generations because
the code of rules to be internalized is to be reevaluated with each new generation.6 But to
hold diachronic moral relativism, we need only think that otherwise identical actions may
be right if performed at one time and wrong if performed at another time.
Notice also from Hooker’s locution “everyone everywhere” that he rejects7 the following
position:
Synchronic moral relativism. An action performed at at time may differ with
regard to its moral status depending on who performs it.
As we will see, Hooker’s theory is inconsistent: he cannot countenance diachronic moral
relativism while rejecting its synchronic sibling. Moreover, Hooker’s arguments in favor of
diachronic moral relativism often count in favor of synchronic moral relativism, exacerbating
this inconsistency.
3.2.1 Objections to premise (1)
Consider the following objection: World 2 is not better than World 1. In World 1, the
poor give to charities that benefit the least well off. But then they immediately receive this
money back, since they themselves are the least well off. So, we could expect Worlds 1 and
2 to have identical levels of aggregate wellbeing.
It will be difficult to respond to this claim without waving my hand at some empirical
assumptions. But since the objection itself is based on an empirical assumption, the question
6The reasons for this reevaluation are discussed below.
7The reasons he gives for this rejection are discussed below.
57
is ultimately whether we think its central assumption is more likely than what I will say now.
First, it is not right to say that the least well off in society will ‘immediately’ have their money
returned to them by the charity. Rather, more likely, they would receive this assistance in
the next month, or the next quarter, or some such. In the interim, they would be needlessly
impoverished. If these are people who would be made worse off by giving (away) their money
to charity, then they are also people who will be made worse off by giving their money to
charity for a few weeks or months. Second, it is unlikely that these people would receive
the same amount of money that they donated in return. What is more likely is that they
would receive slightly less than the original amount, once we account for the overhead of the
charities.
3.2.2 Objections to premise (2)
Empirical objections to premise (2)
Several objections to premise (2) can be classed as empirical objections: they are objec-
tions that rely on claims about what World 2 and World 3 would really be like. Consider
these objections:
1. It is unrealistic to expect World 2 and World 3 to contain identical levels of wellbeing.
Hooker gives this argument at (2000: 82) where he says, “there are advantages of having just
one code for internalization by everyone. These advantages include convenience” (italics
in original). Hooker does not elaborate, but it seems the only way of understanding this
is as a consequentialist consideration. Perhaps he means something like this: World 2 and
World 3 would not have all the same agents engaged in identical patterns of behavior, since
the moral code needs to be taught to different sub-groups of people. We can imagine how
epistemically demanding this would be in practice: Imagine a kindergarten teacher or Sunday
school teacher in World 3 separating her students by income level and asking half of them to
cover their ears each time morality is brought up. Since this would not have to take place in
World 2, these two worlds do not contain all the same agents engaged in identical patterns
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of behavior. Since it would take some additional time and resources to teach different codes
to different social groups, World 2 and World 3 would not contain identical agents with
identical levels of wellbeing, either. In this case, it is more convenient for there to be a single
universal moral code, rather than a regime of relativized codes.
2. World 2 and World 3 would not contain all the same agents with identical levels
of wellbeing, since relativizing the moral code would reinforce a kind of caste system, and
awareness of such a caste system would make people in society worse off.
3. The above description of World 3 is an oversimplification, since it brackets social
mobility. Of course it is unrealistic to suppose that no one will ever move between social
classes. When that happens, a regime of relativized moral codes would fail to guide a person’s
action in the right way.
I believe one response will be sufficient to answer all of these objections: Allow me to
introduce a modified version of the argument that appeals not to multiple populations that
are interacting, but rather appeals to multiple populations who are causally isolated in some
robust way. I will suppose that they inhabit two different planets that are far from one
another. We may imagine divided versions of the worlds given above, i.e. Divided World
1, Divided World 2, and so on, each of which contains two separate planets. Imagine that
the inhabitants of these planets are indistinguishable from humans in terms of their rational
and empathic capacities. Finally, imagine that these two populations of moral agents vary
widely in their material circumstances. For this version of the argument, consider a rule
regarding resource sharing (not just donations to charity) since the “poorer” of these two
worlds is in a situation of extreme material scarcity.
Imagine in the first of these divided worlds that everyone is required to internalize a
single moral code with an imperative rule regarding resource sharing. Imagine in the second
world that this rule is made conditional, which would presumably improve the conditions
of the beings on the poorer planet, perhaps by requiring more resources to be shared in
common. Imagine, finally, that in Divided World 4, the populations of these two planets are
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to internalize moral codes that are strikingly divergent, as would be best for each individual
population. Consider how this response answers the objections above: First, there is no
additional cost between Divided World 2 and Divided World 3 associated with teaching
different moral codes to different social groups. Instead, entire planets are to internalize
different moral codes. Second, if these two planets are causally isolated, then there will be
no worries about the appearance of a caste system: the two populations simply do not know
about each other. Third, and finally, since the two planets are causally isolated, there will
be no mobility from one to the other, i.e. from one level of material scarcity to another.8
Thus, there would be no worries about the possible consequences of social mobility.
This weakened version of the argument sacrifices something in terms of its provocative-
ness: it does not establish that, in worlds like ours, different social groups could be asked
to internalize different moral codes. But it does still establish that various populations of
moral agents, alive at the same time, could be required to internalize different, conflicting
moral codes, and this would establish synchronic moral relativism all the same.
Theoretical objections to premise (2)
Many other potential objections to premise (2) could be classed as theoretical objections:
these are objections about the theoretical reasons we have for preferring World 2 to World
3, rather than claims about what those worlds would be like in terms of their expected levels
of aggregate wellbeing. I will respond to these objections in turn:
1. Rule-consequentialism is the best account of impartially justifiable morality.9 But
allowing two moral codes to be in place at once greatly undermines the ability of one person
to justify her actions to another. In fact, we may even think that the possibility of impartial
justification depends on there being a single moral code. Imagine two people under the
8If we suppose that faster than light travel is impossible, then any two planets orbiting different stars are
practically causally isolated in the sense required for this example.
9I am indebted to Jussi Suikkanen for pointing out this objection.
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jurisdiction of two moral codes who come to interact. Which moral code governs their
interaction? At any rate, these two people will disagree about which action is right.
While this objection, I believe, is properly considered theoretical, it can be answered
by the same response as the empirical objections above. In particular, the situation con-
templated in this objection would not obtain in the divided worlds examples I have already
discussed.
2. Hooker himself is not committed to the maximization of wellbeing, and so he has no
theoretical reason for preferring World 3 to World 2. In fact, he has a strong theoretical
commitment to moral universalism because this coheres well with our intuitions about the
general structure of morality, and the idea that morality is a shared, collective project is one
of rule-consequentialism’s most attractive insights.
Let us take a closer look at why Hooker rejects moral relativism. He says:
the idea of relativizing codes to groups is on the road to relativizing them to
sub-groups, and at the end of that road is relativizing them to individuals. To go
down that road is to turn our backs on one of the traditional attractions of rule-
consequentialism—namely, its basis in the idea that morality should be thought
of as a collective, shared code. (2000: 87)
Hooker approvingly quotes Bernard Gert in support of this claim:
Morality should be taught to everyone, adherence to it should be endorsed by all
members of society whose endorsement counts, and everyone should be urged to
follow it. The requirements of morality apply to all rational persons. (1988: 216)
It’s not clear that this quote provides the support that Hooker needs. First, the concep-
tion of morality as a system of universal rules is controversial among moral philosophers.
The virtue ethics tradition challenges this conception. Maximizing act consequentialism
might also be seen to challenge this conception. We might think of act consequentialism as
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requiring adherence to a single moral rule: act so that you maximize your contribution to
total expected wellbeing. However, maximizing act consequentialists also recognize it may
be self-undermining for people to act with that rule in mind10, and have accepted that not
everyone ought be taught the same moral rules.11 This raises an additional difficulty: it
is unclear whether morality for Gert is a rigid or flaccid designator. Act consequentialists,
even when they accept esoteric morality, might agree with Gert that ‘morality’ applies to all
rational persons, but they might deny that it is the same morality in each case. No one gets
a free pass from the demands of morality, but perhaps morality does not require of A the
same thing it requires of B; perhaps A and B should not be taught the same system of rules;
perhaps A and B ought to act with different rules in mind; and perhaps A and B ought to
be judged according to different sets of rules. If this is all true, it is not clear what overlap
is left for us to say that the same morality applies to both of them. In fact, Hooker accepts
conditional rules, and so he already accepts that morality does not make identical demands
on all its agents, even of those alive at the same time. Moreover, and most troubling, it seems
insincere for Hooker to claim that morality is a system of rules that applies equally to all
rational agents: According to what he says elsewhere, those in the previous and subsequent
generations, though they be rational, need not follow the same rules as we! And this is true
in the most robust sense: not merely that they are under the jurisdiction of some conditional
rule, but that they are under the jurisdiction of an altogether different rule.
Hooker’s worry is that taking the first step down the road to relativism leads inexorably
to the following position:
Individual RC. It is wrong for A to perform some action if that action is forbidden
by the code of rules whose internalization by A would lead to maximum expected
consequences in terms of wellbeing, impartially considered.12
10See Railton (1984).
11This is to adopt the view that morality may be esoteric, i.e. not publicized to all. See Norcross (1997:
387–391) and Eggleston (2013).
12Kahn calls this the Strong Thesis: “for each agent there is exactly one IMC [ideal moral code, which
determines the right action for that agent ]” Kahn (2012: 3).
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If Individual RC collapsed into equivalence with some other moral theory, it would pre-
sumably inherit the vices (and virtues) of that other theory. Does Individual RC collapse into
equivalence with any other moral theories? According to Individual RC, each person ought
internalize the code of rules that, given her peculiar psychological makeup, will maximize
her expected contribution to aggregate wellbeing, taking into account the code’s internal-
ization costs. Following Hooker, let’s suppose that to internalize a rule involves forming the
associated motivations to comply with the rule, but also involves
more than certain associated motivations. It also involves having sensitivities,
emotions, and beliefs—indeed a particular cast of character and conscience. If you
accept a rule against stealing, you will be motivated not to steal simply because
it is stealing. . . You will also be disposed to feel guilty if you steal, disposed to
resent stealing by other people, and disposed to blame them for it. (2000: 91)
On its face, Individual RC bears a resemblance to some other forms of consequential-
ism: maximizing act consequentialism13, sophisticated consequentialism, and motive util-
itarianism. In fact, it does not collapse into content equivalence with maximizing act-
consequentialism14, sophisticated consequentialism, or motive utilitarianism.15 Thus, In-
dividual rule-consequentialism must be evaluated on its own merits.16
Consider one final theoretical objection to premise (2) from Hooker: The best argument
for rule-consequentialism, he says at multiple places,17 is that it does a better job than
other theory of justifying and systematizing our most deeply held moral beliefs. This is the
13See Lyons (1965). Note that this is separate from the charge that rule-consequentialism as a universal
theory collapses into extensional equivalence with maximizing act consequentialism. That is the standard
“collapse objection,” which can be found in Smart (1973) among others.
14Kahn ably demonstrates this at Kahn (2012: 12).
15These arguments are nuanced and overly technical. In order to avoid straying too far from the main
point of the discussion here, I have moved these arguments to Appendix A.
16Consider, for example, another merit of rule-consequentialism that Individual RC would sacrifice. Since
it would be more difficult, if Individual RC were publicized and generally followed, to confidently predict
others’ behavior, Individual RC would lack rule-consequentialism’s advantage in solving collective action
problems and the resulting beneficial “expectation effects.”
17See Hooker (2000: 88, 101).
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argument for rule-consequentialism from reflective equilibrium. These moral beliefs include
beliefs about the general structure of morality, e.g. that morality is a universal, shared
enterprise. Accepting moral relativism sacrifices coherence with this deeply held moral belief,
and therefore weakens the justification for rule-consequentialism. Thus we pay a substantial
theoretical price in moving from World 2 to World 3.
First, we might think it is an open question whether our commonsense morality is as
opposed to moral relativism as Hooker would have us think. But this is not a strong response.
After carefully considering their default relativistic position, many people come to reject it.
There are other worries about the theoretical costs we might pay in moving from World
2 to World 3. For example, we might think that World 3 is worse than World 2 according
to Ockham’s razor. If Worlds 2 and 3 have all the same agents who have identical levels
of wellbeing, then perhaps we ought to prefer the world with fewer theoretical entities, i.e.
fewer moral codes. Thus, World 2 would be preferable to World 3. The response I will offer
now undermines all objections that trade on an alleged theoretical cost incurred in the move
from World 2 to World 3.
Consider again the moves from World 2 to World 3 and from World 3 to World 4. In
moving from World 2 to World 3, we relativize the ideal moral code to separate groups. In
moving from World 3 to World 4, we introduce a new rule into one of these moral codes in
order to increase expected wellbeing in World 4. Thus, the move from World 2 to World 3
can be understood as paying a theoretical price. The move from World 3 to World 4 can be
understood as claiming a reward in terms of increased expected wellbeing. Thus it is easy
to see why the move from World 2 to World 3 is especially objectionable for some: we pay
a theoretical price with no payoff. That payoff only comes in the next world.
Let us consider, then, the move directly from World 2 to World 4. In making such a
move, we would go directly from teaching the poor an otiose rule to teaching them a useful
rule, without simply jettisoning the rule to begin with. In one fell swoop, then, we would pay
a theoretical cost by relativizing in exchange for a moral benefit of making the world better.
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Now we may weigh this cost and this benefit directly against one another. How strong is
our commitment to moral universalism, really, such that we are satisfied to forego increased
expected wellbeing? How stridently should we insist on keeping the world a worse place in
order to maintain an abstract theoretical commitment? This is a question for another time,
but I suspect there will be wide disagreement among the answers to this question.
In order to facilitate this comparison, we could even consider our reasons for moving from
World 3 to World 4 as theoretical reasons rather than moral reasons. Here is how: In moving
from World 3 to World 4, I suggested that we make some people better off while making
no one worse off. Thus, World 4 is clearly morally better than World 3. Recall that the
best argument for rule-consequentialism is the argument from reflective equilibrium, which
argues that rule-consequentialism best coheres with our considered beliefs about morality.
Presumably, many of us have a strong theoretical commitment to securing costless benefits.
That is: we believe that if some theory can make some people better off while making no one
worse off, this counts as a theoretical advantage of that theory.18 Now, we can understand
a direct move from World 2 to World 4, as a purely theoretical tradeoff: a tradeoff between
our intuitions regarding the desirability of moral universalism and intuitions regarding the
desirability of costless benefits. I suggest the case is at least a wash and may in fact favor
relativizing the ideal code to social groups in order to secure such benefits. Thus, even an
argument from reflective equilibrium that seeks to block the move to from World 2 to World
4 may end up supporting that very move.
Finally, notice that this same response can be generalized and given against any miscel-
laneous theoretical complaints about the move from World 2 to World 4: simply consider
the alleged theoretical cost against the theoretical advantage of securing costless benefits in
World 4.
18This theoretical advantage is in addition to making the world where everyone follows that theory morally
better.
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3.3 Hooker’s support for diachronic moral relativism
We have seen that Hooker’s embrace of diachronic moral relativism, given his rejection
of synchronic moral relativism, is inconsistent. Let us consider the reasons Hooker gives for
endorsing that view. First, the ideal code of rules might need to be changed so as to respond
to new problems or to clear away rules meant to deal with ‘old’ problems that have been at
least in some part solved, e.g. institutionalized slavery and the subjugation of women. In
correspondence, Hooker has suggested global warming as a new problem that demands we
alter the moral code we internalize and pass on. Presumably this is intended to maximize
expected consequences in light of the state of the world and our knowledge about it. As
we noted above, however, maximizing expected consequences could also be accomplished by
relativizing the ideal code to social groups. If Hooker’s rationale is that some generations will
have to deal with problems that we don’t currently have to deal with, we should recognize
that this is also true of certain social groups, e.g., with regard to global warming.
Hooker’s second argument concerns gradual changes in human psychology due to genetic
engineering or genetic drift:
Assume that new generations are not changed genetically. If genetic engineering
alters human genetic makeup, the codes that are best will probably be differ-
ent. . . (2000: 32 n1)
Here, Hooker is likely responding to possible changes in humans’ capacities for empathy
and other-directed actions, calculative capacities, introspective abilities, etc. Such changes, if
significant, might alter the moral code that it would be best for everyone to internalize. But
marked differences along these same lines exist in humans that are alive today. If changes in
these factors militate in favor of changing the ideal code for future people, why not for some
people who are alive now? If Hooker is sensitive to potential differences across human history
in our psychological makeup, he ought to allow humans who presently differ psychologically
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in important ways to internalize different codes of rules. And this just is synchronic moral
relativism.
Hooker also supports recalculating the costs of internalizing the ideal code because of his
desire to calculate such costs starting from a blank slate (2000: 79–80). In particular this is
in order to ignore the costs of overcoming racist, sexist, or homophobic dispositions in such
a calculation. Hooker gives two reasons in support of his position: (1) that doing so coheres
with our common belief that racism, sexism, and homophobia are illegitimate attitudes
unworthy of our respect (and so they are); and (2) that the satisfaction or frustration of
‘external preferences’ such as those regarding other people are not plausible constituents
of a person’s wellbeing, and so we need not consider them in our calculations of aggregate
wellbeing. But Hooker need not commit to diachronic moral relativism to accomplish this:
he might as well merely stipulate that overcoming these beliefs should not be included in
calculating the internalization costs of codes of rules.
3.4 Conclusion
There does not seem to be a good reason for relativizing along generational lines and not
at the same time relativizing along social lines. Hooker might answer that people who live in
different generations are causally isolated from one another in a way that people who merely
live in different societies (and are alive at the same time) are not.19 But that is clearly false.
The actions of the present generation can affect the lives of even distant generations. This
is clearest in what Parfit calls “same person” cases, where our actions make some particular
person who exists later better or worse off. But it is also arguably the case in “different
person” or non-identity cases, where our actions can affect the quality of life of someone
who comes to exist later even if she is not identical to the person who would have existed
19For the time being bracket worries about specifying where one generation ends and another begins. (On
this note, the “same-generation-as,” or at least the “alive-at-the-same-time-as” relation is not transitive.)
In fact, society resembles a rope of overlapping chains of generations, such that we can never say when one
generation ends and another begins.
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otherwise (Parfit, 1984: 355–356). So it cannot be an appeal to causal separation that is
doing the work here. Even supposing there were some kind of special causal separation
between generations that did not exist between people alive at the same time: If we are
worried that people alive at the same time who had internalized different sets of rules would
causally interact, the only reason this could matter is if it made a difference to the expected
consequences in that world. But it’s not clear why we could not simply factor this into the
calculus in determining which codes of rules to teach.
The only reason left for opposing synchronic moral relativism is dogma. Hooker is not
alone in this regard, of course, but he makes himself uniquely vulnerable to this criticism by
allowing into his theory a form of moral relativism along generational lines. Hooker uses a few
bad words to describe the proposal for synchronic moral relativism, calling it “paternalistic
duplicity” to suggest one code for the “enlightened elites” of society and another for the
rabble (2000: 85). But why is this objectionable? We typically think of people who are
elitist as selfish or arrogant; we resent economic elites for their avarice, we resent intellectual
elites (insofar as professional philosophers are not they) for their sense of superiority. No
wonder, then, that we would oppose any suggestion that these people should be allowed to
internalize a code that is different, especially if we view that code as more permissive.
But this all ignores the opposite possibility. Why not consider the class of moral elites in
a society as those people who are superior along dimensions of calculative abilities, empathy,
and generosity? These are people who are more willing to sacrifice for the sake of others,
and so a code relativized to their psychological nature would actually be more demanding.
Hence, allowing them to internalize an elitist code such as this would be better for everyone.
Moreover, by putting these moral elites on display, it might set an example for the rest of
society. Even though these moral elites are still playing by a different set of rules in this
scenario, our worries about paternalism and duplicity are greatly diminished.
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I have argued that rule-consequentialists with certain theoretical motivations ought to
adopt a form of moral relativism, according to which multiple moral codes are in place
at once. This is true for theorists who support rule-consequentialism for consequentialist
reasons but, as I suggested above, also applies to theorists who hold rule-consequentialism
because of how it fares in a test of reflective equilibrium. We ought to weigh our theoret-
ical commitments to universalism—which are admittedly usually very strong—against our
commitments to making people better off at no one’s expense. I singled out Hooker as one
theorist who avoids synchronic moral relativism at a significant cost to wellbeing. But he has
already let in its theoretical sibling, diachronic moral relativism. In light of the arguments
given here, I suggest it may be best for him to abandon his commitment to diachronic moral
relativism, which could be done with only a slight change to his criterion of rightness. If he
is unwilling to jettison the one, then he should accept both simultaneously.
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Chapter 4
A jus in bello rule-consequentialist
code of morality
The collection of moral constraints governing warfare can seem like a hodgepodge of
unrelated rules: soldiers are required to wear a fixed sign visible at a distance, required
to give quarter to surrendering troops, and required to minimize civilian casualties, among
other things. Is there some single principle that underlies these and the other rules of warfare
and, in doing so, lends them both their content and justification?
We stand to gain two things by identifying such an underlying rationale. First, any moral
theory that can unify its disparate commands under a single rationale is a more elegant, and
therefore more desirable, theory. Second, we could use such a theory to provide a general—
yet informative—theory of the moral psychology and decision procedure of the just warrior,
thus strengthening the ability of soldiers and policymakers to make principled decisions
where the rules of warfare do not clearly settle the case.
I suggest that rule-consequentialism is especially well-suited to this project of unifying
and justifying the rules of war. This is because rule-consequentialism shares a remarkable
structural similarity with a plausible theory of in bello morality, namely, as a set of near-
absolute rules chosen with reference to and justified by some consequentialist goal. For
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warfare, I suggest that goal is minimizing the horror of war. Accordingly, I sketch a rule-
consequentialist in bello code of morality. I will also discuss the moral dispositions of a
soldier who has successfully internalized this moral code, i.e. the conscience she would
have. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this view for three contentious topics in the
military ethics tradition: the doctrine of double effect, supreme emergency, and the problem
of noncompliance. We will see that this theory offers a plausible justification of the doctrine
of double effect. We will also see that rule-consequentialism already boasts the conceptual
resources to bring clarity to the notion of supreme emergency, namely, in the form of an
“avoid disasters” clause that triggers in the face of especially catastrophic threats.1 Lastly,
I argue that Walzer’s principle of supreme emergency is too restrictive and the typical rule-
consequentialist view too permissive when faced with noncompliance, and suggest taking a
middle ground. The result of all of this is the beginning of an original, nuanced, and plausible
unified view of in bello morality.
4.1 Why look for a unified theory of military ethics?
Soldiers and statesman are bound by a multitude of moral constraints in warfare. These
constraints can seem like a hodgepodge, or to borrow a phrase from elsewhere in normative
ethics, like an ‘unconnected heap of duties’ (Hooker, 1996). Unifying this unconnected heap
could benefit us in at least two ways.
First, we would gain at the theoretical level. Suppose we are considering two theories, A
and B, which issue equally informative and intuitively plausible moral commands. So far, A
and B are equally appealing candidate moral theories. Suppose, however, that theory A also
boasts an underlying, unifying rationale for its commands while B lacks any such rationale.
Proponents of theory A can point to reasons why its commands are commands, “all the way
to the ground,” as it were. Theory A would have an advantage over theory B in this case;
1In Appendix B, I give further reasons for preferring a consequentialist axiology to a communitarian one
when formulating a theory of supreme emergency.
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it could claim a theoretical virtue that theory B could not claim. Other things being equal,
then, theory A would be a better theory, and we would be right to prefer it over theory B.
I suggest that our current theories of jus in bello are in the position of theory B. If a jus
in bello code of morality could be derived from a single, unifying moral principle that was
independently plausible, then our theories of the ethics of war would be improved.
Perhaps some of the above has gone by too quickly. Aren’t there already very explicit
underlying goals of the just war tradition? Clearly, there are some rules of warfare that hail
from some common origin, and we have a common goal in erecting and enforcing these rules as
constraints. Namely, there exist the general goals of proportionality and discrimination in the
conduct of warfare, which in turn generate more fine-grained, concrete moral requirements.
These underlying goals do help to explain the constraints at the surface level of jus in
bello, but they do not explain all of the surface constraints. Moreover, the requirements of
discrimination and proportionality themselves are not basic, and admit of further unification.
Perhaps both can be explained by an appeal to the value of human life. But the just war
tradition does not hold that all human life is equally valuable, as evidenced by the special
protection afforded to noncombatants.
If we could find a unifying, independently plausible justification that grounded the moral
constraints on warfare, our theory would be more appealing in itself. But theoretical concerns
like this are controversial, and some would not treat it as even a tie breaking reason for
preferring one theory over another. It must be admitted, however, that deriving such an
underlying rationale would yield dividends at the practical level by helping us divine the
answers to difficult or controversial questions. Military ethics is rife with such cases, and
identifying an underlying rationale could shed light on these. It could provide guidance
in cases such as supreme emergency, the doctrine of double effect, and noncompliance—
all three of which are discussed below. It could also guide us when evaluating emerging
military technologies, such as cyberweapons or autonomous weapons systems, which have
often stymied consensus among military ethicists.
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4.2 A unifying rationale
So, there are good reasons for seeking an underlying, unifying rationale to our theories.
When discussing an underlying, unifying rationale, I have in mind something like Kant’s
categorical imperative. While Kant gave several formulations of his categorical imperative,
they were allegedly interderivable.2 Let’s take Kant’s first formulation: “Act only on that
maxim by which you could at the same time consistently will that it become a universal
law of nature.” If Kant is to be believed, this single principle itself is a complete picture
of morality; it tells us everything we need to know. It tells us how to act in each case and
it goes some way to justifying those actions. While some additional details are required to
justify the principle all the way to the ground—such as the preeminent role rationality plays
in Kant’s moral theory—we have a single principle that lends everyday moral requirements
both their content and their justification. It tells us both what to do and why to do it. What
we seek is an analogous principle to unify and justify the rules of warfare.
4.2.1 Just war theory as a system of near-absolute constraints on warfare
First, the rules of war are a set of near-absolute constraints. For example, the prohibi-
tions against intentionally targeting noncombatants, taking human shields, and mistreating
prisoners of war are extremely stringent. In fact, there are very good reasons for soldiers and
policymakers to believe that the rules of war are actually absolute: problems would likely
arise if we were to see ourselves as free to break them. One problem of particular concern
is the increased threat of escalating, violent reprisals that would result. Motivated by this
fear, Walzer and many other just war theorists therefore hold that we are never at liberty
to violate the rules of war.
Even given this description of the theoretical landscape, where these rules are often
described as absolute, they are not absolute in practice. There is hardly a more egregious vi-
2While this seems relatively plausible for some pairs of formulations, such as the first and second, con-
temporary Kantians are still unsuccessful in deriving every one of them from every other.
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olation of the rules of warfare that intentionally murdering large numbers of noncombatants,
for example, by intentionally bombing city centers. Thus, Walzer, among others, considers
the prohibition against city bombing absolute. Even though Walzer is infamous for his de-
fense of supreme emergencies, cases in which we are permitted to violate the rules of warfare,
he still believes in these cases that the rules of war do not recede and are not overridden,
but are violated.3 Thus even in the hands of someone like Walzer, who takes the rules of
warfare seriously enough to deny that they genuinely recede in supreme emergencies, we find
the practical injunction to violate those rules. Thus the rules of war are only near-absolute.
4.2.2 The deontologist’s challenge
If we wish to generate and justify the rules of war, we will need to settle on a theory whose
structure is as close as possible to just war theory, i.e. we would do best to find a theory
that is also a set of near-absolute constraints. Ideally we would find a model elsewhere in
normative ethics that can supply us with a theoretical framework, a theory that is amenable
to what we have said in the previous section about the structure of just war theory. It might
seem easy to narrow our focus immediately to some species of deontology. In fact, if the
choice is between consequentialism and deontology, the deontologist might feel she has a leg
up on the consequentialist. She might say:
This is an easy win for the deontologist. Not only have deontologists included
constraints in their theories—and often very strict constraints—but the idea of
constraints is antithetical to the consequentialist project! We do not have to look
far at all to find just war theorists rejecting consequentialism nearly out of hand,
motivated by this belief. Thus, if we are to narrow our focus to some corner
of normative ethics, we should limit ourselves to considering various species of
deontology.
3Walzer’s description of supreme emergency is puzzling in part because of this explicitly paradoxical
feature: we at least occasionally ought (all things considered) to act in some ways that will knowingly violate
the rules of warfare.
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This is the deontologist’s challenge and, if it were accurate, it would quickly rule out con-
sequentialist theories from our consideration. The deontologist has good reasons to believe
in a profound tension between consequentialism and just war theory, a tension which has not
been lost on others. But the challenge is only successful if it is true that, as the deontologist
says, constraints are antithetical to the consequentialist project.
The central complaint with consequentialism from just war theorists is an ignorance of
the differential value of the lives of combatants and noncombatants, an ignorance of the
unanimous view among just war theorists that, in wartime, we cannot trade off the lives
of one soldier against one combatant. Nor is it the case—some4 have pointed out—that
we can trade off the lives of a thousand, or even a million soldiers against the life of one
noncombatant. Noncombatants are off limits from intentional attack, no matter the value or
strategic advantage that may be secured in intentionally targeting them. Consequentialism
allegedly can make no sense of this, since all are to count for one and no one for more than
one. For these reasons, consequentialism has been considered at least misguided and at worst
an enemy of the just war tradition, ready at a moment’s notice to license wholesale slaughter
or, in Nagel’s terms, massacre, in the interest of mere expediency.
Careful students of consequentialism will notice that one species of consequentialist the-
ories has been neglected in the above discussion. The characterization of consequentialism
that our deontologist gives is not true of every species of consequentialism, but only those
species that are direct.5 For while most consequentialists reject constraints, not all of them
do. Among the genus of indirect consequentialist theories that the deontologist hastily rules
out is one notable species: rule-consequentialism. Rule-consequentialism (RC) is a family of
ethical views that are committed to the following two principles6:
4Anscombe (1981).
5And even then it’s not obvious that all she says is correct. For example, see the work of Doug Portmore,
which has focused on developing an axiology that could allow consequentialists to replicate the requirements
and prohibitions of deontology Portmore (2007). See McNaughton and Rawling (1991; 1998) for opposing
discussion of the same question. Work by Portmore and others has led to the belief, now fairly common, that
any deontologist theory may be “consequentialized,” that is, reproduced as a species of consequentialism.
6I paraphrase this formulation from Kahn (2013).
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(1) An action is right if and only if it accords with an ideal code of moral rules.
(2) A code of rules is ideal only if its acceptance7 by some portion of the pop-
ulation (usually at least the overwhelming majority of agents) would have
the best expected consequences.
In contemporary forms of rule-consequentialism, including the version espoused by
Hooker (2000), the theory’s foremost contemporary defender, the ideal moral code will
contain many near-absolute moral rules. Rules against harming others or their property,
including murder and theft, are plausible candidates for rules that would be near-absolute.
This is because we could expect a code of rules that prohibited those actions, except in very
rare circumstances, to make the world better, were it internalized by most agents. Thus in-
direct consequentialist theories like rule-consequentialism maintain a place for near-absolute
constraints.8 Rule-consequentialism thus avoids the deontologist’s challenge.
4.2.3 The ultimate goal of the just war tradition
The deontologist may respond:
Rule-consequentialism does let in near-absolute constraints, but it is still a non-
starter as a model for the rules of war because it relies on there being some
consequentialist criterion by which we judge a set of rules to be the best. Thus
we can only understand just war theory as a species of rule-consequentialism if we
can specify the consequentialist criterion by which we judge candidate codes gov-
erning the conduct of war. To be fully convincing, this consequentialist criterion
must be independently plausible as something worth pursuing, and it should bear
a significant resemblance to the project of just war theory. There exists no such
7Distinctions between internalizing, accepting, and following the ideal moral code are real but need not
concern us here.
8This could be true of other forms of indirect consequentialism, for example, Adams’ motive utilitarianism
(1976). However, no other indirect consequentialist theory as clearly and explicitly consists of a set of near-
absolute rules.
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general consequentialist project to be found underlying the just war tradition.
Thus, rule-consequentialism must be rejected.
The deontologist is correct that the work for rule-consequentialists is not yet done, but
this second challenge is not difficult to meet. Just war theory can in fact be re-described as
pursuing a consequentialist project, both in its ad bellum and in bello requirements. This
consequentialist criterion is both independently plausible and bears a significant resemblance
to the project of just war theory. I suggest that this consequentialist criterion is the mini-
mization of the horror of warfare.
Horror. Instances of suffering and death that are especially gruesome or tragic,
beyond what is typical in human life.
Not all instances of suffering are horrible, but all things that are horrible in this sense
are instances of suffering. It is meant to conjure that revulsion and visceral shock that is
the natural response to reports of casualties in wartime: soldiers who are mangled, burned,
disemboweled; innocents who are crushed or obliterated in their homes by night time bombing
raids.
This definition is intuitively plausible. Consider these synonyms for horrible offered by
Google, many of them equally apt descriptions of the phenomenon I wish to capture:
dreadful, awful, terrible, shocking, appalling. . . horrendous, horrid, hideous,
grisly, ghastly, gruesome, gory, harrowing, heinous, vile, unspeakable; nightmar-
ish, macabre, spine-chilling, blood-curdling; loathsome, monstrous, abhorrent,
hateful, hellish, execrable, abominable, atrocious, sickening, foul. . .
Reducing the amount of horror, so understood, is a worthy goal on its own.9 It is a
project we can agree we ought to pursue, whether we are consequentialists or deontologists.
9The reason we ought to reduce the amount of horror in the world might be parasitic on the reason we
have to reduce the amount of suffering in the world. At any rate, we have good reason to reduce the horror
in the world, whether this moral requirement is basic.
77
And many of the traditional constraints of just war theory can be understood as trying to
minimize the horror of warfare. For example, take several of just war theory’s traditional ad
bellum criteria: last resort, probability of success, and proportionality—these all plausibly
have consequentialist underpinnings. Since war is horrible, it ought to be a last resort,
only pursued after all other (less-horrible) means of conflict resolution have been exhausted.
Likewise for reasonable probability of success—since it would be especially horrible for a war
to be waged in vain. (Notwithstanding that some theorists allow exceptions for heroic self-
defense, even when foreseeably futile.) This is also the case with proper authority, though the
case to be made is more circuitous here. While I am confident that a robust and plausible ad
bellum morality premised on minimizing the horror of war could be developed, My interest
here is mainly with developing an in bello code of morality, so I will have to leave this
discussion unfinished.
Finally, here is a sketch of a rule-consequentialist theory of jus in bello:
Rule-consequentialist In Bello Code. An act in wartime is wrong if and
only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by soldiers and
policymakers we could expect to best minimize the horror of war.
The above criterion of wrongness can plausibly be used to underpin a regime of near-
absolute constraints on soldiers and policymakers. These constraints are broadly consonant
with the general principles of jus in bello: First, acts of force must discriminate between
combatants and noncombatants. Extreme care must be taken to avoid injuries to noncom-
batants since the harm that befalls noncombatants epitomizes the horror of war. It may
strike some readers as incredible that a consequentialist theory could justify an absolute
moral distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Surely, a cornerstone of conse-
quentialism from Bentham on has been to regard all individuals as morally equal and, more
precisely, to claim that an episode of suffering is not more or less morally important depend-
ing on whose it is. But this objection mistakes the difference between mere suffering and
horror, the more complex concept that tracks considerations besides mere suffering. Above
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I suggested that horror tracks the degree to which harms are caused indiscriminately by
warfare. Thus someone who has internalized the in bello code will strongly prefer the death
of a combatant to a noncombatant, other things being equal—and even when other things
are quite unequal.
Second, acts of force must be proportionate to the strategic goal, never inflicting more
harm than is necessary, as one of the aspects of war that is horrible is its seeming dispro-
portionality. See, for example, the absurd casualties endured in the trenches during the
First World War, where thousands of soldiers could die in order to advance their state’s
territory by just a few miles, or less. Both of these constraints would also serve to minimize
reprisals and escalations as far as possible, again reducing the total amount of carnage that
takes place in wartime. This in bello code would also likely require the humane treatment of
surrendering soldiers and prisoners of war, and respecting the other jus in bello constraints.
Notice that these near-absolute constraints can be understood as the corollaries of near-
absolute rights, possessed both by soldiers fighting a war and by noncombatants who are too
often the victims of war’s destructive potential. We may call these quasi-rights, since they are
justified only by the fact that their general observance would tend to minimize the horror of
war, and they are not grounded in any of the bases more popular with deontologists, such as
human dignity, rationality, or autonomy. However, this difference does nothing to diminish
their stringency. Thus, this rule-consequentialist in bello code can effectively impersonate a
just war theory grounded in a claim about the rights of soldiers and noncombatants. That
is, this theory would plausibly be extensionally equivalent to a rights-based just war theory,
and its analogous commands would boast equivalent strength.
For rule-consequentialism, the ideal moral code is the one that we could expect to make
the world as good as possible if it were internalized by the overwhelming majority of the rele-
vant moral community. For previous versions of rule-consequentialism in the normative ethics
literature, this is usually taken to mean all moral agents. For an in bello rule-consequentialist
code of morality, the relevant moral community is likely those people directly involved in the
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business of making war, at least those in whom some decision making authority rests. As
the criterion of wrongness above lets on, soldiers and policymakers are plausible candidates
for the population who should internalize these rules. There are others who are nonetheless
involved in the business of making war, such as those working in bomb factories, but they
need not internalize the in bello code. This is for a few reasons: First, their decisions do
not significantly impact the course of a war, at least not in the way that the decisions of
soldiers and policymakers do. These people do not directly and immediately contribute to
the suffering and death that war brings. And perhaps most importantly, their decisions
and contributions to the war-making effort do not have implications for the army’s respect
for discrimination and proportionality. A factory worker surely cannot do anything herself
to ensure that her bomb falls on—or is at least intended for—a combatant rather than a
noncombatant. Thus, the population meant to internalize this code must be those actively
engaged in the immediate business of waging war and those others whose decisions in large
part determine the actions of the first.10
According to contemporary versions of rule-consequentialism,11 to internalize a rule is
to acquire a disposition to follow that rule, to feel bad when one breaks the rule, and to
enforce general rule-following with social sanctions. The strength of the disposition to follow
a rule is proportional to the importance of the rule itself, such that we ought to have a
stronger aversion to murdering than to lying, for example. Likewise for the in bello code, to
internalize a rule is to form the dispositions to avoid specific violations. This includes having
the strong motivation to follow that rule for its own sake, to encourage others to follow it,
to feel guilty when having broken it, and to censure others who have broken it. Since almost
10It was suggested to me that some factory workers could purposefully sabotage their work in the interest
of weakening the war machine, and thus could have some impact on the justice of the war being fought. This
suggestion is intriguing but I ultimately find it implausible. Briefly, I find it implausible that this kind of
behavior could go on very long, carried out by enough people, in order to make a difference to the efficacy of
the host country’s war machine. It seems likely to me that such an occurrence would not go long unnoticed,
and that it could very well result in the factory overseers’ demanding even more work from their workers as
punishment or in order to compensate for the erstwhile shortfall.
11Here I am thinking especially of Hooker (2000).
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all of the in bello constraints are nearly absolute, soldiers who have successfully internalized
the in bello code will find it nearly impossible to violate them.
In many scenarios in warfare, the received moral guidelines do not clearly settle the case
for or against some behavior. Here, an in bello code offers a useful decision procedure for
determining what an agent ought to do. Suppose that an agent is deciding between actions
A and B. According to rule-consequentialism, she ought to ask herself, “Would the world
be better if, in this situation, people felt compelled to do A or B?” Likewise, soldiers and
policymakers who have internalized the in bello code ought to ask, “Would war be less horrific
if, in this situation, soldiers and policymakers felt compelled to do A or B?” We should try
to inculcate in our soldiers and policymakers those consciences such that, if all other soldiers
and policymakers had the same conscience, war would go best in terms of being least horrific.
Finally, notice that the in bello code specifies the necessary and sufficient criterion of
wrongness for acts of force during wartime. It seems that all actions that are wrong will
be actions that violate some stringent right of non-combatants or otherwise run afoul of
the in bello requirement of proportionality. And all actions that violate the immunity of
non-combatants or are purposefully disproportionately violent are, of course, wrong in war.
What we have now are the beginnings of a plausible unified account of right conduct in
wartime.
4.3 The in bello code and supreme emergency
Let us now apply this fledgling theory to some of the more contentious topics in the
ethics of war. Examining the theory’s dictates here will provide the first evidence of its
acceptability, or else cause us to reject it.
First, we will examine this theory’s implications for supreme emergency. While Churchill
is credited with coining the term supreme emergency, the doctrine receives its original philo-
sophical explication in Walzer (1977). There, Walzer contemplates whether a potential
outcome in warfare can ever be so cataclysmic as to justify massive and intentional viola-
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tions of the rules of war. He believes that there are such scenarios, and the possibility of a
Nazi conquest of Europe is his motivating example. Nazism, Walzer says,
was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a prac-
tice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive,
that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immea-
surably awful. We see it—and I don’t use the phrase lightly—as evil objectified in
the world, and in a form so potent and apparent that there could never have been
anything to do but fight against it. . . Here was a threat to human values so radi-
cal that its imminence would surely constitute a supreme emergency. . . (Walzer,
1977: 253)
Nazism’s triumph would have represented the eradication of multiple political commu-
nities and would have threatened political liberalism the world over. In the face of such
an imminent disaster, Walzer argues we are justified in violating the inviolable immunity
of noncombatants; we are justified in doing whatever is necessary to avoid such a disaster.
The normal rules of warfare do not recede or lose their force according to Walzer. On the
contrary, Walzer relishes the apparent paradox in the idea that we could be required to do
what is morally wrong.
Notably, rule-consequentialism already contains the theoretical machinery analogous to
Walzer’s supreme emergency. In rule-consequentialism, this exception clause takes the form
of a rule stating simply, “Avoid disasters.” The justification for the inclusion of this rule is
identical to the justification for the inclusion of all of the other rules. Namely, everyone’s
internalizing a code that included a rule to avoid disasters would make the world go better
than if everyone internalized a competing moral code that lacked such a rule, other things
being equal (Hooker, 2000: 134–136).
Hooker’s discussion of what constitutes a disaster in rule-consequentialism is intentionally
vague. This is one place where vagueness in our moral theories may be inescapable, and
where the best we can do is appeal to the judgment of a morally well-educated person.
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He does tell us that greater disasters license the violation of more stringent rules. For
example, presumably, we are justified in telling a lie to prevent a person from being harmed,
and justified in harming one person to save the life of another. But the violations we are
contemplating here are much more awful: we are contemplating intentionally killing and
maiming not just a single person, but scores of innocent people, perhaps even hundreds of
thousands of them, as was the case in the struggle against Nazism.12 What scale of disaster
could possibly justify this much wanton violence?
We will have to turn to Walzer for some insight into the conditions that justify resort
to supreme emergency. Here is what Walzer (2004: 50) and others say. First, the threat-
ened disaster must represent a “far greater immorality” than the actions we will undertake.
In the case of Nazi Germany, this condition was met at one time since the total destruc-
tion or enslavement of a political community is much worse than the deliberate killing of
noncombatants, short of the destruction of a political community. Walzer says that “our
deepest values and our collective survival” must be at risk—presumably the “we” is rela-
tivized to a particular political community, i.e., Britain (Walzer, 2004: 33). Orend uses a less
demanding criterion here, not invoking the imminent destruction of a political community,
but instead using the terms, “widespread massacre and enslavement” (Orend, 2006: 140).
Orend’s position is weaker than Walzer’s, and thus to justify a supreme emergency, Orend
must rely on the more dubious claim that widespread massacre and enslavement is a far
greater immorality than the widespread deliberate killing of noncombatants.
Second, the threat must be very real and very near success. Orend says that there must
exist “public proof that the aggressor is just about to defeat the victim militarily” (Orend,
2006: 140). Later, Orend strengthens this requirement to say that it demands imminent
military collapse, not just defeat. This, he means, amounts to the “total collapse of an
effective armed forces capability, literally rendering [the victim] defenseless” (2006: 147).
12To be precise, Walzer believes that most of the bombings of Nazi cities were unjustified, since they took
place long after they would have been necessary to repel a Nazi invasion of England (Walzer, 1977: 253 ff.).
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Presumably this is abhorrent because it would pave the way for the widespread human
rights violations contemplated in the first criterion.
Third, the immoral response being considered must be the only way of preventing the
disaster from obtaining. Orend suspects that, regarding this last point, political leaders are
much too quick to resort to supreme emergency because of a lack of imagination (2006: 156–
157). Notice that this requirement is likely vulnerable to the same objections as traditional
just war theory’s “last resort” criterion. That is, the notion of last resort may be incoherent
in the same way as the notion of a largest number.
In the hands of Walzer, the supreme emergency exception is only justified by a communi-
tarian axiology. No simple conquest or loss of territory can justify a supreme emergency. The
threat must be to the “ongoingness” of a community itself. Walzer’s motivation for supreme
emergency is to avoid a disaster on the scale of the destruction of an entire community and
an ultimate loss of value. Threatened with eradication, Walzer claims that governments are
absolutely forbidden from forsaking their citizens, “putting the community itself and all its
members at risk,” while there may be some options still open for resisting. Orend agrees,
saying that a government standing down in the face of a supreme emergency is an abdication
of its duty to protect its subjects “when effective resistance might still be available” (2006:
152). Walzer admits this argument fails unless we appreciate the irreducible value of the
ongoingness of a political community. He explains:
We do try to carry on, and also to improve upon, a way of life handed down
by our ancestors, and we do hope for recognizable descendants, carrying on and
improving upon our own way of life. This commitment to continuity across
generations is a very powerful feature of human life, and it is embodied in the
community. When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial
extension or governmental structure or prestige or honor, but in what we might
think of as its ongoingness, then we face a loss that is greater than any we can
imagine. (Walzer, 2004: 43)
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Walzer refuses to say his argument depends on the possibility that, in the case of a
political community, “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (2004: 42). However,
Walzer must locate a special kind of value somewhere. Imagine two scenarios, one that
involves the massacre of 200,000 noncombatants and a second that involves the massacre
of 200,000 noncombatants who together fully constitute a political community. Supposing
the other criteria for supreme emergency are met, Walzer’s arguments above would support
resort to supreme emergency only in the second case, even though these two cases contain
equal amounts of carnage. What makes the difference is the threat to the political community
itself in the second case. Walzer denies that his view places value in a political community
itself, but it is difficult to see how he can avoid this. Walzer says that resort to supreme
emergency is not permissible “when anything less than the ongoingness of the community is
at stake” (2004: 46). At any rate, Walzer must locate value in the political community that
is not simply the sum of the value of its individual constituents. That value is located in the
ongoingness, the preservation, of a particular way of life.
Walzer’s communitarian language is foreign to the consequentialist tradition, and his
axiology is one it would be difficult to integrate into a consequentialist framework. Thus,
a rule-consequentialist account of supreme emergency will differ from Walzer’s. Luckily,
there is ample independent reason to jettison Walzer’s communitarian approach to justifying
supreme emergency. First, we might think that tying supreme emergency to the death of a
political community constrains the range of ethical judgments we can make during wartime.
It would be troubling if supreme emergencies arose in all and only those situations in which
the ongoingness of a political community were at stake. That’s because it would prevent
us from saying the following things. For one, certain political communities ought not be
preserved, or at least the value of their preservation is less than that of some other political
community. This plausibly depends on the size of a political community and the degree to
which it either respects the rights or promotes the flourishing of its citizens. These are claims
that Walzer cannot account for, but that a consequentialist theory of supreme emergency
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could easily handle.13 Conversely, it seems that a resort to supreme emergency might be
justified by something short of the death of a political community. For example, Orend
notes that the detonation of several atomic weapons in America might be enough to cripple
its military responsiveness and damage its culture and way of life (2006: 145). While this
would be an unimaginable catastrophe, it would not obviously spell the end of America’s
political community. Thus there seem to be disasters short of the destruction of a political
community that could justify a resort to supreme emergency.
By jettisoning a commitment to the value of communities as such, we could also avoid
many thorny ontological questions: What constitutes a political community and what are
the conditions for its identity over time? What counts as threatening the destruction of a
community rather than merely changing it significantly? Is slaughter and enslavement always
required, as Orend says, or could a regime of draconian punishments (short of massacre)
aimed at changing a society’s mores constitute a sufficient threat to a culture? I criticize
one popular argument for the value of communities as such in Appendix B.
Second, we could expand our theory of supreme emergency to apply to soldiers as well as
policymakers. Walzer holds that supreme emergency is a doctrine only for political leaders,
and that soldiers are never to take these kinds of matters into their own hands. But there
may be situations in which a soldier has to make a decision to torture or to kill innocents
to prevent wholesale rights violations, such as to prevent the threatened detonation of a
nuclear weapon in a population center. In cases in which the soldier alone is faced with such
a decision, and has lost contact with their superiors, it seems unwise to tie the hands of the
soldier.14 Notably, Orend is either sloppy on this point, or disagrees with Walzer without
13Walzer and Orend voice the standard position within the just war community that communities that are
currently involved in massive human rights violations are not entitled to exist. But a consequentialist view
could improve upon this sharp dichotomy between worthy and unworthy regimes, more closely matching
the intuitive view that political communities fall along a continuum, and even those that are not currently
involved in massive violations of human rights might be reprehensible enough that they are not due the same
respect as maximally liberal democracies.
14This is not to give a blank check to soldiers to violate the rules of warfare. Recall that, ideally, the rules
of warfare are near-absolute, and should be violated only in the most extreme circumstances, and only when
the agent has excellent evidence of her justification.
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being explicit: he says several times (e.g. 2006: 154) that supreme emergency is a doctrine
for soldiers and policymakers, apparently without noticing his important disagreement with
Walzer.
In fact, Walzer’s strategy has been rejected by others, including Orend. Orend is notably
reluctant to use the same kind of communitarian language that Walzer is fond of. Nowhere
in his discussion of supreme emergency (2006: ch. 5) does he speak of the death of the
community, or the end of its ongoingness. I take Orend’s implicit rejection of Walzer to
be a result of his recognition that such a communitarian approach is vulnerable to serious
objections. A consequentialist view can make sense of the same three criteria just discussed
for supreme emergency, and a rule-consequentialist theory of in bello morality can justify
violating the otherwise-absolute rules of warfare. So much, then, for supreme emergency.
4.4 The in bello code and the doctrine of double effect
Once we understand a rule-consequentialist system as supplying the ideal shape of an
agent’s conscience, we can make sense of the importance of the mental states of soldiers
and policymaker. This allows us to discuss in detail the doctrine of double effect (DDE), a
notoriously contentious issue within just war theory. The doctrine of double effect can be
taken either as a metaphysical thesis about the nature of harm or as a question of whether
the mere mental state of an actor can affect the moral status of her action. The question
before us here is one of the second type: whether the in bello code would include a stronger
prohibition against intending harm to civilians as a means to achieving some end, or whether
soldiers ought to feel equally reluctant to kill civilians when it is intended as when it is merely
foreseen as a consequence of their action.
For consequentialists, many moral questions are simply empirical questions, in the sense
that they could not be definitively answered from the armchair. The DDE is one such
question. There are plausible consequentialist reasons on either side of supporting a stronger
prohibition on intending harm than on merely foreseeing harm. First, we might think that,
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because humans are imperfect rational agents, we should err on the side of caution in the
case of intending harm. Both Walzer (2004: 38–39) and ?: 112 ff, in fact, have argued in this
way in analogous discussions of rule-violations.
On the other hand, there are many reasons to think that including an equal prohibition
against intending harm as against foreseeing harm would better minimize the horror of
war. For one, distinguishing between the two might be superfluous to the moral code.
The existing demand that violent actions should be proportionate to their ends will already
require that the number of noncombatant deaths is as low as is possible. We cannot be sure
that a prohibition requiring soldiers to take additional care would be effective in significantly
reducing the number of lives saved. In fact, we might think soldiers are better calculators
when this stronger prohibition is not in place. Perhaps the willingness to intend harm is less
likely to be abused because soldiers are more likely to take the deaths they inflict seriously
when they are intended rather than when they are ‘merely’ foreseen. This is a reason we
should allow them to contemplate intentional killings.15
The answer to this question ultimately relies on unavailable empirical evidence. How
frequently does the opportunity to intend harm, versus merely foresee it, arise in war? How
much of a difference would such a prohibition actually make? And so on. The stance we
take on the doctrine of double effect from the point of view of in bello code depends on these
questions, but their answers are impossible to discover from the armchair. For what it’s
worth, I find it plausible that, in the absence of empirical evidence to settle the claim, the
best strategy is to forbid soldiers and policymakers from intending harm as a means for fear
that might increase the horror of war. Thus, this theory might be termed weakly pro-DDE.
15In fact, if this is true, then we might take the argument to the extreme and say that there ought to be a
stronger prohibition against merely foreseen civilian deaths versus than those that are intended. This would
be because we want to guard against solders’ writing off civilian deaths as an allowable level of ‘collateral
damage’ when those deaths are merely foreseen.
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4.5 The in bello code and non-compliance
Finally, a third contentious issue in the ethics of war regards situations of noncompliance.
Do our moral obligations change when the enemy is not respecting the rules of war? In
Walzer, this is the problem of reprisals, as reprisal violence or rights-violations are often
the resort of the victim (see 1977: 207 ff). Are reprisals justified? How much risk should
we require our soldiers to bear in these situations before loosening the constraints on their
conduct? It is this very question that leads Walzer to formulate the doctrine of supreme
emergency, discussed above. Walzer’s answer, as we have seen, is that soldiers are not
justified in violating the rules of war until the heavens really are about to fall (see, for
example, 1977: 232, 251 ff).
However, as I argued above, one of the advantages of understanding supreme emergency
through a consequentialist lens is that we would be able to make a broader range of important
moral claims. One of those claims we might want to make—one plausible facet of in bello
morality—is that soldiers can be justified in violating the rules of war when something less
than a supreme emergency threatens them, especially when they are threatened with torture
or enslavement on an individual level. Unlike Walzer, we cannot wait until the heavens are
about to fall before we violate the rules of war.
Perhaps the solution has been developed within the rule-consequentialist literature in-
stead. Noncompliance also poses a serious problem for rule-consequentialism, as the foun-
dation of the theory is a stipulation about what everyone else is doing, despite the fact that
it’s rarely true that everyone else really is acting in the requisite way. Thus, it seems rule-
consequentialism is especially vulnerable to the problem of free riders. Hooker’s solution
is remarkably permissive compared to Walzer’s: we are no longer required to reciprocate
toward those who are not obeying the rules of morality when it would require a significant
personal sacrifice to comply (?: 125, 165 n. 10).
Hooker’s requirement that the agent be faced with significant sacrifice is crucial, since it
might vary in everyday morality whether we are required to reciprocate to free riders. In
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times of war, however, the stakes are appreciably raised, and the enemy’s noncompliance can
immediately endanger the lives of soldiers. In situations where grave danger is commonplace,
Hooker’s criterion for violating the rules of war would be met almost routinely. If this
were the case, solders would have license to disregard the rules of war at the first sight of
noncompliance. This, clearly, is unacceptable.
There are other reasons to avoid Hooker’s solution and, instead, strengthen the require-
ment that soldiers endure unfair treatment from the enemy before being licensed to retaliate
with their own violations. For one, the rules of war might be thought of as more important
than the rules of everyday morality because they have a greater potential to cause massive
suffering. Even comparatively trivial rules of war regard the wellbeing and lives of many
people. The choices before us are not whether to break a promise or to tell a lie; they are
decisions about whether to bomb a civilian area, kill a prisoner of war, carry out mass arrests
and detentions, or use morally problematic weapons such as white phosphorous. These de-
cisions, which are far lesser violations than Walzer thinks a supreme emergency authorizes,
are still clearly grave. We should hesitate to cast off the restraints of morality, as Hooker’s
solution would dictate, in the face of noncompliance.
Second, as mentioned above, this solution would amount to free license for soldiers and
policymakers to do whatever they should want to the enemy at the first sight of noncompli-
ance. And we should certainly want to avoid this situation. First, it threatens unrestrained
massacre and reprisals. Second, it requires less of our soldiers than we think they ought to
bear. We commonly expect our soldiers to respect the rules of war when fighting an enemy
that disregards those rules, and even when it means they will bear a substantial burden as
a result.
So, Walzer’s approach is too stringent: we should endorse something less demanding.
Hooker’s solution is too liberal, and provides license for wanton violence in the face of a
noncompliant enemy. We have to take a middle ground. We demand that our soldiers
bear at least some hardship before loosening the restrictions on their combat. However, we
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also realize they are justified in violating the rules of war in situations short of supreme
emergency. We further recognize that greater dangers should license them to break more
stringent restrictions.
As it is difficult to precisely quantify the value at stake in moral decisions, so it will be
difficult here to draw an exact line for how much soldiers should have to endure before being
allowed to break the rules of war. My intuition is that they ought to bear a substantial
burden before that happens. Indeed, soldiers are thought to have to go to their own death
before violating the most stringent rights of noncombatants.16 We are justified in breaking
the rules of war only when something terrible, outside the normal horrors of war, is almost
certain to happen otherwise.
While definitive answers are still forthcoming, we can appreciate the clarity that this
rule-consequentialist in bello code brings to the issue of noncompliance, as well as the other
issues of warfare canvassed above. That this theory boasts a plausible consequentialist
underpinning and does an excellent job of unifying and systematizing the rules of warfare, I
believe, bodes well for its prospects for contributing to the military ethics tradition.
16For example, even if the only way a soldier may ensure her survival is by taking a human shield, she is
still forbidden from doing so.
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Appendix A: Individual
rule-consequentialism and collapse
Rule-consequentialism (RC) determines the rightness of actions by reference to an ideal
moral code (IMC) of rules which applies to all (or almost all) agents. This is the case in RC’s
canonical formulations, for example, Brandt (1979), Harsanyi (1977), Hooker (2000), and
Parfit (2011). Relativized forms of rule consequentialism, which specify different ideal moral
codes for different social groups, have been considered before17, yet they have not received
serious attention until recently.18 Leonard Kahn’s recent article, “Rule-consequentialism and
scope” (2012) is one such discussion that provides a powerful argument for relativizing the
ideal moral code.
Proponents of rule-consequentialism often appeal to either the maximization of aggregate
welfare or coherence with our considered moral intuitions (or both) to support their view.
Kahn’s argument appeals to rule-consequentialists who endorse rule-consequentialism for
either of these reasons. First, he argues that relativizing the ideal code to social groups
would plausibly make some people better off while making no one worse off. Second, he
notes that this relativized view is thus coherent with our intuitions regarding the desirability
of costless benefits, i.e. it better passes the test of reflective equilibrium.
Kahn lays out three possibilities for a version of relativized rule-consequentialism:
17See for example (Brandt, 1979: 194) and Hooker (Hooker, 2000: 189).
18See especially Kahn (2012), the focus of this note. See Oddie (1998) for an earlier discussion that is
tangential to the points made here.
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Weak RC. For each relevant group there is an IMC, where G is a group with
regard to some set S of agents if and only if G is composed of two or more agents
who form a proper subset of S. (a.k.a, the Weak Thesis) (2012: 632)
Moderate Relative RC. Some morally ideal codes hold for groups of agents while
others hold for a single agent. (a.k.a., the Moderate Thesis) (2012: 633)
Strong Relative RC. For each agent there is exactly one IMC (a.k.a., the Strong
Thesis) (2012: 633)
The most radical of these is the strong thesis: the view that every individual ought to
internalize an idiosyncratic moral code. Kahn ultimately endorses the moderate thesis, as he
believes that rule-consequentialists have good reason to “stop short,” as it were, of endorsing
a unique moral code for each person. Still, Kahn spends some time considering what this
radical view would entail. In his discussion that Kahn leaves out important comparisons
between individual RC and other popular moral views. Here, I explore these overlooked
comparisons.
First, a more complete explication of Kahn’s Strong Relative RC, which I will call Indi-
vidual RC:
Strong Relative RC (a.k.a., Individual RC or simply IRC). It is wrong for agent A
to perform an action if is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by A
would lead to maximum expected consequences in terms of wellbeing, impartially
considered, other things being equal.
Kahn considers the possibility that Individual RC collapses into equivalence with other
moral theories. Kahn entertains these suggestions for the sake of clarity, he says, but there
is more at stake in this discussion: If IRC collapsed into equivalence with some other moral
theory, it would presumably inherit the vices (and virtues) of that other theory. That is, IRC
would be problematic if it collapsed into equivalence with some other objectionable view. If it
could be shown to do just that, then rule-consequentialists would have an additional reason,
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appealing to reflective equilibrium, to reject IRC. On the other hand, if IRC collapsed into
some eminently plausible view, then it would benefit by association. What we are examining
here is whether IRC stands or falls with any other better-known theory in ethics. The answer
is ultimately No, and we must judge this nascent moral theory on its unique merits.
Kahn considers the possibility that IRC collapses into equivalence with maximizing act-
consequentialism19 and ethical egoism, and shows that it does not collapse into equivalence
with either (2012: 642). Here, I examine whether IRC collapses into equivalence with two
other views, sophisticated consequentialism and motive utilitarianism, to which IRC bears
a striking resemblance. I will show that it collapses into equivalence with neither.
First, note we might mean at least three things by equivalence in this context.20 This
distinction allows for greater nuance in our discussion than others have given. Lyons (1965)
provides the seminal discussion of equivalence within the consequentialist tradition. There,
Lyons says two principles are “extensionally equivalent” if they “always yield substantively
identical (equivalent) judgments with respect to particular acts” (Lyons, 1965: 29). Notice,
though, that two theories may yield equivalent judgments about which acts are right and
wrong, but disagree about an agent’s praiseworthiness, or about what ought to be done in
order to successfully follow a theory. Hooker is not concerned, either, with making such
fine-grained distinctions when he argues that rule-consequentialism does not collapse into
equivalence with maximizing act-consequentialism (2000: 93–99). Yet it is possible, as I
show below, that two theories may be equivalent in one of these respects and inequivalent
in another.
19See Lyons (1965). Note that this is separate from the charge that rule-consequentialism in its more
familiar universal formulation collapses into extensional equivalence with maximizing act-consequentialism.
That is the standard “collapse objection,” which can be found in Smart (1973) among others.
20Note that Kahn does not mention equivalence in his original article, but rather collapse, using the
shorthand common in discussions of the collapse objection to rule-consequentialism.
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Behavioral equivalence. Two theories are behaviorally equivalent if and only if
an agent who successfully follows the one performs all the same actions21 as an
agent who successfully follows the other.
Rightness equivalence.22 Two theories are rightness equivalent if and only if they
agree on the rightness and wrongness of all actions.
Praise equivalence. Two theories are praise equivalent if and only if they agree
on the praise- and blameworthiness of agents with regard to all actions.
Finally, consider the following complex judgment of equivalence:
Content equivalence. Two theories are content equivalent if and only if they are
behaviorally equivalent, rightness equivalent, and praise equivalent.
According to IRC, each person ought to internalize the code of rules that, given her
peculiar psychological makeup, will maximize expected utility, taking into account the code’s
internalization costs. Following Hooker (2000), let’s suppose that to internalize a rule involves
forming the associated motivations to comply with the rule, but also involves
having sensitivities, emotions, and beliefs—indeed a particular cast of character
and conscience. If you accept a rule against stealing, you will be motivated not
to steal simply because it is stealing. . . You will also be disposed to feel guilty
if you steal, disposed to resent stealing by other people, and disposed to blame
them for it. (2000: 91)
On its face, IRC bears a resemblance to some other forms of consequentialism: sophisti-
cated consequentialism and motive utilitarianism. IRC collapses into behavioral equivalence
21For simplicity I will not distinguish between acts and actions. I do take an agent’s mental states such
as intentions to be partly constitutive of an action.
22Woodard (2013) calls this “deontic equivalence.” In reference to Portmore’s work on consequentializing
(2007), Woodard says: “To consequentialize a theory, one must devise a theory of value that, when combined
with act-consequentialism, yields the target theory’s deontic verdicts in all cases” (2013: 261). Thus, what
Woodard has in mind by “deontic equivalence” (2013: 262) is a necessary—but not the sufficient—condition
for what I here call content equivalence.
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with the first of these theories and a modified version of the second, but does not collapse
into content equivalence with either.
According to sophisticated consequentialism, an agent ought to cultivate the set of dis-
positions that will allow her to maximize her expected contribution to wellbeing, impartially
considered, over the course of her life.23 So far, this is just what IRC requires, so sophisti-
cated consequentialism and IRC are behaviorally equivalent. However, the two theories differ
significantly in their criteria of rightness and in their assignments of praise and blame, and
so are not content equivalent. Because sophisticated consequentialism is a species of max-
imizing act-consequentialism, the right action in any particular instance is the action that
contributes the maximum expected amount of wellbeing to the world, even though this is
frequently not the action supported by the ideal set of dispositions. In this somewhat bizarre
fashion, even the scrupulous sophisticated consequentialist must accept that she frequently,
or perhaps always, performs the wrong action. She merely denies that this is blameworthy.
According to IRC, though, the right action is the action that follows from the ideal set of
dispositions, and acting in accordance with those dispositions is praiseworthy. Thus, IRC
does not collapse into content equivalence with sophisticated consequentialism.
Motive utilitarianism receives its seminal explication in Adams (1976). On motive util-
itarianism, the morally perfect person “would have the most useful among the patterns of
motivation that are causally possible for human beings” (Adams, 1976: 470), where a per-
son’s pattern of motivation is the sum total of “wants and desires, considered as giving rise,
or tending to give rise to actions” (Adams, 1976: 467). If having internalized a rule for IRC
means the same as having a motive for motive utilitarianism, then IRC seems to collapse
into behavioral equivalence with motive utilitarianism.
At first it seems that internalizing the individual ideal moral code of rules might result
in the same conscience as would becoming the ideal motive utilitarian agent, since both
23See Railton (1984) for sophisticated consequentialism’s canonical formulation and defense. See Norcross
(1997) for further elaboration.
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theories recommend the set of dispositions that would be expected to maximize wellbeing,
impartially considered, over the course of one’s life. In fact, it would not. Because these
theories are not behaviorally equivalent, they cannot be content equivalent, either. They
are not behaviorally equivalent because while both theories seem to recommend the same
set of motivations, they do not. In evaluating competing codes of rules, i.e. competing
sets of dispositions, rule consequentialists take into account the internalization costs of each
code (Hooker, 2000: 78–80). Thus, while it might maximize expected consequences to have
internalized some code of rules—perhaps the set of motives that Adams thinks optimific—
that code might have a prohibitively high cost to internalize and so would be ruled out
by rule-consequentialism. Adams makes no such allowance for the internalization costs of
sets of dispositions. Thus, some sets of dispositions are open to him that are ruled out by
rule-consequentialism.
However, there is one modification Adams could make to motive utilitarianism such that
the two theories would be behaviorally equivalent. Let’s call “wants and desires, considered
as giving rise, or tending to give rise to actions” first-order motives, and let’s call motives
regarding the formation of first-order motives second-order motives. Thus, I may have a first-
order motive to eat meat, and a second-order motive to reform that particular motivation
in order to become a vegetarian. Suppose the ideal motive utilitarian agent has a second-
order motive which moves him to bring his present set of motives into line with the ideal
set recommended by motive utilitarianism. Surely the inclusion of this second-order motive
in the motive utilitarian calculus will change the set of all motives, first- and second-order,
that would best maximize expected utility, since acting on his second-order motive will
involve shouldering certain burdens, exerting efforts, enduring psychological strain, etc., in
the pursuit of perfecting his first-order motives. Hence, acting on this second-order motive
carries a cost analogous to the internalization cost of the ideal code for rule-consequentialism.
In this case, IRC and motive utilitarianism move closer together. In fact, I suspect the set of
first-order motives each theory would recommend would be identical, given this modification,
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and so would be the actions each would recommend. Thus the theories would be behaviorally
equivalent.
It is worth noting additionally that, for Hooker, an agent need not act from a rule having
been internalized, but need only act in accordance with the ideal set of rules, in order to
perform a right action. Not so on Adams’ theory. Motive utilitarianism is a theory about
which motives an agent ought to have and not a theory of which actions are right (Adams,
1976: 474). If Adams requires certain mental states for an action to be right, for example,
then the theories will not be content equivalent. But he is silent on the matter and so we
cannot know whether IRC and our modified motive utilitarianism are content-equivalent.
Individual rule-consequentialism does not collapse into equivalence with maximizing act-
consequentialism or egoism, as was previously shown. Here, it was shown that individual
rule-consequentialism does not collapse into sophisticated consequentialism or motive utili-
tarianism, either, two theories with which it bears a remarkable superficial similarity. Individ-
ual rule-consequentialism must be evaluated on its own merits, then. Rule-consequentialists
of some stripes, for example, those who argue from a kind of universalization or contractu-
alism, will not be moved by the arguments for IRC. But this new theory seems to satisfy
our desires both to make the world a better place and to cohere with our considered moral
intuitions, in particular, our intuitions regarding costless benefits. These are two notable
advantages of the theory. An all things considered judgment of the plausibility of individual
rule-consequentialism would require a much broader investigation, which must be left for
another time.
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Appendix B:
An argument against
communitarianism
In the hands of Walzer, supreme emergency is justified only by a grave threat to a political
community as such. In turn, this fits well within Walzer’s general communitarian framework.
However, in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I developed a rule-consequentialist ac-
count of just war theory. If we are to justify the resort to supreme emergency within the
consequentialist tradition rather than the communitarian one, we must remove the emphasis
that Walzer places on the political community itself. To bolster those arguments, I give sev-
eral reasons in this appendix to dismiss the communitarian claim that a political community
has value in itself. I take Charles Taylor’s argument (1997) to be characteristic of those
made by philosophical communitarians.
Taylor’s argument, briefly, is this:
(1) A particular culture is essential to the enjoyment of some irreducible goods,
such as fulfillment or freedom. That culture is the necessary background
condition against which obtaining these goods becomes possible.
Taylor argues that, for certain goods, it is incoherent to say a person is enjoying those
goods without referencing her cultural context. “Thoughts presuppose and require a back-
ground of meanings to be the particular kind of thoughts they are. But the terms ‘presup-
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pose’ and ‘require’ in the previous sentence point to a peculiarly strong relation. . . Certain
thoughts are impossible in certain circumstances” (1997: 132). Taylor adds, “As individuals
we value certain things; we find certain fulfillments good, certain experiences satisfying, cer-
tain outcomes positive. But these things can only be good in that certain way, or satisfying
or positive after their particular fashion, because of the background understanding developed
in our culture” (1997: 136).
(2) If x is necessary for the enjoyment of some intrinsic good y, then x is itself
intrinsically good.
Taylor makes this rather surprising claim at (1997: 137). He says that if x is “essentially
linked” to y, or “analytically undecomposable” from y, then x is not only instrumentally
good, but is itself intrinsically good. He continues, “[A culture] can’t be distinguished from
them [the individual goods it makes possible] as their merely contingent condition, something
they could in principle exist without. . . Consequently, it is hard to see how we could deny
it [the culture] the title of good, not just in some weakened, instrumental sense. . . but as
intrinsically good” (1997: 137).
∴ (3) A certain culture, over and above the individuals that live in it, is itself an
intrinsic good. (MP 2 & 3)
There are a number of criticisms we could make of this argument. First, (2) above seems
false. Being able to show that my explanation for why y is intrinsically good must refer to
some x, i.e. y is analytically undecomposable from x, does not seem to be sufficient to show
that x is also intrinsically good. Suppose I particularly enjoy going for lazy Sunday drives
around my neighborhood. Suppose further that I receive a particular kind of pleasure from
this, a kind of pleasure that could not be secured any other way. My Sunday drives are
certainly a good for me. But according to Taylor, my neighborhood itself is also a good. It
is certainly plausible to say here that my neighborhood has some instrumental value for me,
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but Taylor goes further: he has to say that my neighborhood is an intrinsic good because it
is essential to the securement of some further good—after all, I could not get this particular
enjoyment by driving around some other neighborhood. But that seems to mistake the idea
of an intrinsic good. It is coherent to say instead that, even if some good x is the only way
of securing good y, that x is merely an instrumental good.
Regarding (1) above, it seems plausible to say that some culture provides the linguistic
content of a concept like freedom, for example. However, it seems false that having any such
linguistic content is necessary to enjoying freedom, i.e. that it is necessary to the enjoyment
of being free. More plausible is the epistemic claim that, while I may enjoy x, I get even more
pleasure by recognizing that I am enjoying x. But that recognition is itself not an essential
part of the original enjoyment. Before freedom took on the sense that it did with the rise
of liberal democratic states in the 18th and 19th centuries, it seems that people could have
still taken pleasure in the possession of some autonomy, i.e., in the ability to choose to live
in ways consistent with their own values and desires. This is true even if the pleasure of
such an experience were inexplicable or ineffable. It seems a similar argument could be given
regarding the most important kinds of “irreducible” goods in our lives: personal autonomy,
political self-determination, close, loving relationships, pleasure, fulfillment, etc.
Finally, with regard to just war theory in particular, notice also that Taylor’s argument
is only successful if consequentialism is committed to what he calls atomism. His argument
above is meant to show that atomism leaves something out, since it cannot account for
the additional value located in the ongoingness of a community. There are two ways to
understand Taylor’s statement: first, as asserting that consequentialist theories only count
the pleasure and pain that sentient creatures enjoy. If this were true, consequentialism could
not account for an extra good that is not located in any particular individual, i.e. the good
constituted by the ongoingness of a political community. This is usually, but not always, true
of consequentialism. In fact, it could locate value anywhere, not just in sentient creatures.
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A version of consequentialism inspired by G. E. Moore might locate value in the beauty of
a rose thousands of light-years away from here.
Second, we might understand Taylor’s atomism as a rejection of organic unities. Thus,
atomism might be the view that that moral value aggregates “simply,” such that nothing
can ever be more valuable than the sum of its parts. Again we can turn to G. E. Moore
to show that Taylor is wrong: one can be a consequentialist and embrace organic unities.
There is nothing in the defeat of atomism, if Taylor really has defeated atomism, that entails
the defeat of consequentialism. Consequentialists usually locate value in the wellbeing of
conscious creatures, but they could also ascribe value to the ongoingness of a culture. I have
been at pains to undermine the claim that there exists some extra value located in political
communities as such, since this claim is essential to one version of the doctrine of supreme
emergency within just war theory. If I have failed, and there is some irreducible value to be
found in political communities as such, consequentialism can still make sense of such value,
clearing the way for a consequentialist account of supreme emergency.
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